

**Delayed, Arrived—For Hava,
beacon of survival, with love**

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—J. M.

On Counter-Enlightenment, Existential Irony, and Sanctification: Essays in the Sociology of Western Art Musics

Introduction

The sociology of musics is the study of the societal and social facets of creation, performance, reception, and functions of music. Topics in the sociology of musics have included: musics, societies, and meanings; differentiating musicians and audiences; differentiating composers and performers; the patronage of music and musicians in time and space; the recruitment, socialization, and training of musicians; courtship, marriage, and family relations; the social status and material well-being of composers and performers; the social structure and organization of ensembles and performer groups; the social geography of music; the migration and absorption of musicians in new settings; audiences and the reception of music; musical establishments and patrimonies; music in modern social movements, politics, and ruling regimes; women, minorities, and “underdog” groups in music; technology and music; notation; musical instruments; printing and publishing; electronic amplification and reproduction; marketing and the commodification of music; and musical therapy and healing.

In this introductory chapter, I introduce the topic of Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Western art musics. This book explores “existential irony” and “sanctification,” which are discussed by music scholars either in connection with specific composers’ works (Shostakovich’s, in the case of “existential irony”) or merely in passing in biographies of composers of “classical” musics. In the book, I show their generality and sociological sources and

correlates in contemporary Western art musics. To the best of my knowledge, these topics have not previously been the focus of any other studies.

The Sociology of Musics

The “sociology of musics” (more conventionally called the “sociology of music” or “music sociology”) is a relatively new discipline, and may be more familiar to music historians, critics, and musicologists than it is to sociologists. This is partly because many of those engaged in the sociology of musics are, or have themselves been, musicians or qualified musicologists, have addressed topics in or close to musicology, and have probably published in musicological journals more frequently than in sociological journals.

The most prominent figures in the formulation of the objectives of the sociology of musics are Max Weber (1958) and Theodor Adorno (1976). More recently—in the work of Howard Becker (1982, 2014), for example—those working in the sociology of musics have increasingly analyzed the social contexts and social organization of production, the distribution and reception of a wider range of musical “works,” music making as a “collective activity,” and the “social construction” of musics and their “meanings.” In “Some Ideas on the Sociology of Music,” Adorno draws distinctions between the production, reproduction, and consumption of music, stressing that each is a “social product” (1976). The sociology of music has a dual objective for Adorno: determination of social meanings of music and, not identically, investigation of music’s place and function in society. For Adorno, in fact, these two objectives are often in discord. Music sociology requires both an analysis of aesthetic content and a social decoding of music, even before formulating empirical descriptions or making observations—or, indeed, before comparisons or development of data about musical consumption or description of musical organizations.

Pioneer sociology of musics scholars have indicated their particular areas of interest in their chapter titles and syllabuses (see, especially, Etzkorn 1975, 1989; Supićić 1987; Finnegan 1989). Papers by Dowd (2001) and Turley (2007) offer excellent descriptions of the scope of the sociology of musics. The sociology of musics, viewed or defined as the “sociology of production, distribution, and reception of musics,” is a diverse field, incorporating: Weber on music’s relationship to rationalization and post-Enlightenment demystification; Adorno’s notion of music as fundamentally entwined with society; the Becker Art Worlds (or Music Worlds) approach to the social contexts and patterns of production and distribution of art and music; Simon Frith (1996) and

Tia DeNora (2000) on music as a resource for behavior, health, well-being, and social organization, as well as on the musical components of social reality; and John Shepherd's and Peter Wicke's writing (1997) about the musical dimensions of culture. My own research, as represented in this book, investigates the significance of sociohistorical Enlightenment and sociocultural Counter-Enlightenment for three aspects of Western art musics: 1. existential irony; 2. sanctification of secular musics; and 3. migrations and related sociodemographic trends and examples.

Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment in Western Art Musics

Scores of books and hundreds of scholarly papers have been published on the philosophical, political, ideological, socioeconomic, and cultural causes and consequences—realized and ongoing—of the European and North American Enlightenment in the eighteenth century. The Enlightenment introduced the principles of reason and equality into European thought—to the extent that they became the philosophical basis of the American Revolution (and its founding documents the Declaration of Independence, the Federalist Papers, and the Constitution) and the French Revolution (and its major text the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen).

The late political scientist Zeev Sternhell (1935-2020) shows in *The Anti-Enlightenment Tradition* (2010) that anti-Enlightenment ideas and political movements emerged almost simultaneously with the Enlightenment. These ideas, in Sternhell's view, laid the foundations for the tragedies of twentieth-century, totalitarianism, the wars against fascism, and the Holocaust. His main anti-Enlightenment villains are the philosophers Edmund Burke (1729-97) in England and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) in Germany, both of whom were writing even before the French Revolution.

In November 1790, Edmund Burke published his influential *Reflections on the Revolution in France*. He viewed the Enlightenment as central to the wish to overthrow both the Church and the traditional (that is, aristocratic) political order. Burke rejected the notion that reason was the sole criterion for institutional legitimacy and denied it the right to question the status quo. According to Burke, Enlightenment thinkers did not believe that society was legitimate if it could only ensure subjects a decent life. Rather, these intellectuals demanded individual happiness or national utopia. He claimed that the rights of man, and the idea that society is the product of the individual's will and exists solely in order to assure his comfort and happiness, are dangerously delusional and

anti-Christian. For Burke, nations exist by virtue of their veneration of history, the established Church, and the elite. Overturning tradition, replacing the establishment, and destroying the power of the Church is tantamount to conquest by barbarians. Accordingly, all means of crushing the French Revolution are justified.

In this era of intellectual conflict, it was the German philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder (1704-1803) who formulated a coherent synthesis of anti-rationalism, relativism, nascent ethnic communalism, and historicism. Herder abhorred the idea of a world governed by reason, and in defiance of universalism he declared that each culture was singular. Furthermore, he brushed aside the importance of individual rights, replacing it with a mystical conception of language and national community. In other words, he championed historicism—in the sense of providential history—against a “constructivism” that modeled society as a collection of sovereign individuals. According to Sternhell, Herder represents “the first link in a chain that led to the disaggregation of the European world.”

Sternhell’s third anti-Enlightenment villain is the philosopher and iconic public intellectual, Isaiah Berlin (1907-97). Berlin is routinely, though somewhat controversially, cited as originating the term “Counter-Enlightenment” to indicate anti-Enlightenment thought and political movements; and Berlin in his own writings and in writings attributed to him by his editors, successors, and promoters was clearly the main agent of the term’s popularity (Church review of Sternhell, *The Review of Politics* 72 [2010]:731-738).

Much of Berlin’s work deals with a number of overarching themes. These include the relationship between science and the humanities; the philosophy of history; the origins of nationalism and socialism; and the revolt against what Berlin called “monism,” in general, and rationalism, in particular, in the early nineteenth century and thereafter; and the vicissitudes of ideas of liberty.

In Berlin’s account, the thinkers of the Enlightenment regarded human beings as essentially kind or malleable. This created a tension within Enlightenment thought between two views: 1) that nature dictated human ends; and 2) that nature provided more or less neutral material to be molded rationally and benevolently (ultimately the same thing) by conscious human efforts, such as education, legislation, rewards, and punishments—the whole apparatus of society, in fact. Berlin also attributed to the Enlightenment the conviction that all human problems, in the realms of both knowledge and ethics, could be resolved through the discovery and application of the proper method (generally, reason—itself taken as identical with the methods of the

natural sciences, physics especially); and that human interests were ultimately compatible with the morally good. Berlin argued, then, that for Enlightenment writers conflict and wickedness, for example, were the result of ignorance, deception, or the oppressive practices of corrupt authorities (particularly the Church).

Berlin viewed the style of thinking that began to emerge shortly before the French Revolution, and became ascendant during and after it, particularly in Germany, as profoundly antagonistic towards the Enlightenment. He was particularly interested in German Romanticism, but also looked at other parts of the broader Counter-Enlightenment. Berlin sometimes focused on the attack on the Enlightenment's benevolent and optimistic liberalism by nationalists and reactionaries; sometimes on the rejection of moral and cultural universalism by champions of pluralism; and sometimes on the critique of naturalism and scientism by thinkers who advocated a historicist view of society as fundamentally dynamic, shaped not by the laws of nature but by the contingencies of history.

Berlin has been viewed both as an adherent of the Enlightenment, who showed a fascination with its critics, and as staunch opponent of the Enlightenment and supporter of its enemies. There is some truth in both of these pictures, but neither does justice to the complexity of his views. Berlin admired many Enlightenment thinkers and explicitly regarded himself as "on their side." He believed that much of what they had accomplished had been for the good; and, as an empiricist, he recognized them as part of the same philosophical tradition to which he belonged. But he also believed that they were wrong, and at times dangerously so, about some of the most important social, moral, and political problems, and regarded their psychological and historical vision as shallow and naïve. Indeed, he traced to the Enlightenment a technocratic, managerial approach to people and politics to which he was profoundly opposed, and which, in the late 1940s and early '50s, he considered one of the gravest dangers facing the world.

Yet Berlin also held that the Enlightenment's enemies were in many ways dangerous and deluded, sometimes more so than the Enlightenment itself. He condemned or dismissed their metaphysical claims, singling out the philosophies of history of Hegel and his successors for special criticism. He was also wary of the aesthetic approach to politics that many Romantics had practiced and fostered. And, while appreciative of some elements of the Romantic conception of liberty, he saw the movement's influence on the development of the idea of liberty as largely corrupt. Despite this, he thought the

Enlightenment's opponents had pointed to many important truths that it had neglected or denied, both negative (the power of unreason and the passions in human affairs) and positive (the inherent value of variety, the importance of the private virtues of integrity and sincerity, and the importance of choice for human dignity). Romanticism rebelled against the constrictions of reason and promoted human will—and Berlin was sympathetic to this stance. But he also believed that they had gone too far both in their protests and their celebrations. He remained committed to the goal of understanding the world so as to be able to “act rationally in it and on it” (1990, 2).

Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment Ideas

The ideas and practices of the Enlightenment have been familiar in Western societies since at least the early eighteenth century. Some date the beginning of the Enlightenment to René Descartes' 1637 philosophy of “*cogito, ergo sum*” (I think, therefore I am), while others cite the publication of Isaac Newton's *Principia Mathematica* (1687) as the culmination of the Scientific Revolution and the beginning of the Enlightenment. Indeed, numerous authors have cited Magna Carta (England, 1219) and the Glorious Revolution (England, 1688-89) as precursors to the Enlightenment.

The Enlightenment included a range of ideas centered on the sovereignty of reason and the evidence of the senses as the primary sources of knowledge, and advanced ideals such as liberty, progress, tolerance, fraternity, constitutional government, universal suffrage, and separation of church and state. The central doctrines of Enlightenment philosophers (Jefferson, Madison, and Thomas Paine in the US; Rousseau, Locke, Hume, and Kant in France, England, Scotland, and Germany respectively) were individual liberty and religious tolerance, as opposed to absolute monarchy and the fixed dogmas of the Church. The Enlightenment was marked by an emphasis on the scientific method along with an increased questioning of religious orthodoxy—an attitude captured by Immanuel Kant's essay *Answering the Question: What Is Enlightenment?*, where the phrase “*Sapere aude*” (Dare to know) can be found.

Baruch Spinoza's systematic rationalist metaphysics, which he developed in his *Ethics* (1677) in part in response to problems in the Cartesian system, was also an important basis for Enlightenment thought. In contrast to Cartesian dualism, Spinoza developed an ontological monism according to which there is only one substance—God or nature—with two attributes, corresponding to

mind and body. Spinoza's denial, on the basis of strict philosophical reasoning, of the existence of a transcendent supreme being, his identification of God with nature, drive the strands of atheism and naturalism that thread through Enlightenment philosophy. His rationalist principles also resulted in a strict determinism and repudiation of any idea of final causes. According to Spinoza, the key to discovering and experiencing God is philosophy and science, not religious awe and worshipful submission. The latter gives rise only to superstitious behavior and subservience to ecclesiastical authorities; the former leads to enlightenment, freedom, and true blessedness (i.e., peace of mind).

Jonathan Israel (2001) identifies what he calls the "Radical Enlightenment" with Spinoza. He argues in great detail that Spinoza "and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Radical Enlightenment everywhere, not only in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Italy, and Scandinavia but also Britain and Ireland," and that this form of the Enlightenment, leaning towards religious skepticism and republican government, led to the modern liberal democratic state (2001, 2019).

Isaiah Berlin's use of the term "Counter-Enlightenment" is less than uniformly crystal clear; and, partly because of his iconic status generally in contemporary English-language scholarship, famous formulations such as the "two concepts of liberty" (the doctrine of simultaneously holding opposing or contradictory values), and notion of the "hedgehog and fox," his discussion of the Counter-Enlightenment has given rise to extensive debate among philosophers, historians, journalists, and authors, and been the subject of many international symposia, books, and academic papers (See, for example, Dworkin, Lilla, and Silvers 2001; Mali and Wokler 2003; Norton 2007; and Lestition 2007). Some writers have variously argued that Berlin implicitly rejects the Enlightenment ideas of equality, secularism, and nonnationalism; others hold him up as the "patron saint" (Hausheer 2003, 48) or "epitome of the spirit" (Wokler 2003, 25) of the Enlightenment. In most instances, commentators have viewed both the Enlightenment and Counter-Enlightenment (separately) as historical sociopolitical movements, despite the absence of evidence (other than that of the French Revolution), regardless of the historical and geographical disparities among the thinkers Berlin discusses.

In an important paper presented at the International Seminar in Memory of Sir Isaiah Berlin (University of Tel Aviv) in 1999 to 2000, Michael Confino (1926-2010), the historian of eighteenth- to twentieth-century Russia, wrote:

With regard to Western Europe, scholars, whatever their approaches and interpretations, are more or less in agreement with the *terminus*

a que of the Enlightenment and on the main tenets and theories. There is, to say the least, a common ground, a shared understanding of the essentials, regardless of the not negligible differences of, for instance, whether the Enlightenment was a “movement,” as Isaiah Berlin assumes, or an assemblage of a wide range of ideas (camped together and called for convenience’s sake “Enlightenment”). Similarly most scholars assume that the Counter-Enlightenment was a counter-ideology or counter movement; in either case they succeed in outlining its basic ideas within certain agreed-upon temporal and theoretical limits. Finally, this conceptual unity would prevail (although it might be seriously shaken) if one considers, as I do, that the term Counter-Enlightenment is essentially a convenient and elegant metaphor signifying a loosely connected, and sometimes even opposed, set of thinkers and ideas; or, on the contrary, if one believes that this is a powerful paradigm which imposes order and hierarchy on the intricate taxonomy of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Western World of ideas and ideologies. (2003, 177)

I fully subscribe to Confino’s understanding and use of the concept and term “Counter-Enlightenment.” It is neither a political movement nor a philosophical statement. To be sure, in along with casting Joseph de Maistre as a proto-fascist, Berlin (1990) suggested that there were Counter-Enlightenment movements in France and in Germany; and his student, Graeme Garrard, has written that

Between 1749, when Rousseau’s *Discours sur les Sciences et les Arts* first appeared, and the publication of Maistre’s *Soirées de Saint-Pétersbourg* in 1821, a movement gradually developed against the Enlightenment, culminating in a complete rejection of its central ideas and assumptions by many writers of the early nineteenth century. Rousseau is a crucial figure in this movement. His writings, beginning with his first discourse, contain one of the earliest major critiques of the Enlightenment project. In a sense, Maistre’s works are the consummation of many of the ideas and arguments first directed against the Enlightenment by Rousseau. (1994, 98)

That said, the following do not necessarily constitute Counter-Enlightenment political movements: fundamentalist or evangelical religious movements; writings or expressions of support for (or the restoration of) religious, monarchist,

or absolutist authority. Rather, these are all components of the sociocultural setting of Counter-Enlightenment.

In this book I use the term “Counter-Enlightenment” primarily to refer to the *sociocultural contexts* in which the main Enlightenment elements, as cited above, are not dominant and, indeed, are largely absent. In fact, I use the term to designate social and cultural conditions in which there is no universal subscription to the Enlightenment in its entirety. I will show that the Counter-Enlightenment is the major historical and musicological origin, and link between, of the subjects discussed in this book. This may include pre-Enlightenment, post- or anti-Enlightenment, “communitarian” societies or important sectors. Counter-Enlightenment examples which I cite include: 1) the literate population of early post-Revolutionary Russia; 2) pre-Enlightenment Jewish and other ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe; 3) immigrant ethnic communities in North America; 4) Romani (Gypsy) and “traveler” populations in Europe; 5) most of the current population of Israel; 6) stable and migrant Black African slave and post-slavery populations in the Americas and Europe; and 7) post-Enlightenment artistic and cultural elites and consumers in Europe and North America.

The Enlightenment and Western Art Musics

The best known and most widely cited analysis of the bearing of the Enlightenment on Western art musics is that of Max Weber in his posthumously published book *Die rationale und soziologischen Grundlagen der Musik* (1921), published in English in 1958 as *The Rational and Social Foundations of Music*. Editors and translators Don Martindale and Johannes Riedel include a detailed account of Weber’s sociology of music in the context of his general analysis of the role played by rational social action in the development of Western societies (xi-iii), but a brief and elegant summary of the sociologist’s position is provided by Edward Rothstein (1995, 216):

Max Weber ... noted that the development of Western music ... followed the course of “rationalization” in society – the displacement of religion by civil authority, the increasingly intricate structural relations between social organizations, and the systematization of knowledge itself. Music, he argued, passed from religion to science and secular life, from manipulation of repeated pattern to the exploration of hierarchy and structure, from regulatory boundaries

on harmonies and intervals to attempts to create a form of abstract knowledge about combinations of sounds. Music might be considered, in this light, as a counterpoint of Western science.

Weber argues that the musicological innovations that accompanied the rationalization and demystification of Western societies included improvements in the design, production, and marketing of existing musical instruments. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, first and foremost among these was the popularization of the pianoforte. This trend has been identified, described, and analyzed by Arthur Loesser in his classic *Men, Women and Pianos: A Social History* (1954), as well as by numerous other scholars. From its invention in 1709-26 by Bartolomeo Cristofori in Italy, its near-ubiquitous adoption in European, North American, and South American middle-class homes in the nineteenth century, to its dominance of concert stages from the eighteenth century to the present, the piano has proved itself *the* Enlightenment musical phenomenon.

But the rationalization of music was recognized and described even earlier than Weber. Jean-Phillipe Rameau's 1722 *Treatise on Harmony* initiated a revolution in music theory. Rameau (1683-1764) posited the "fundamental law," or what he referred to as the "fundamental bass," of all Western music. Heavily influenced by new Cartesian modes of thought, Rameau's methodology incorporated mathematics, commentary, analysis, and a didacticism that aimed at illuminating the structure and principles of musics scientifically. Through careful deductive reasoning, he attempted to derive universal harmonic principles from natural causes. While previous treatises on harmony had been purely practical, Rameau embraced the new philosophical rationalism and quickly rose to prominence in France as the "Isaac Newton of Music." His fame subsequently spread throughout Europe, and his *Treatise* became the definitive authority on music theory, forming the foundation for instruction in Western music that persists to this day (Crocker 1986, 350-52).

Recent scholarship has increasingly recognized the central role that Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) played in the musical life of Enlightenment France. Rousseau was active as a composer, theorist, copyist, compiler, editor, and polemicist. His interests ranged across the full field of eighteenth-century musical thought: musical antiquarianism (Greek harmonic theory and medieval music, especially that of Guillaume de Machaut); musical ethnography (particularly Chinese, Persian, and Amerindian musics); music theory (notably the writings of his great contemporaries Giuseppe Tartini and Jean-Philippe Rameau);

operatic aesthetics (especially the century-long and seemingly endemic controversy over Italian and French opera, but also melodrama, *opera comique*, and the opera reform movement associated with Gluck); systems of musical notation, and so on. Though somewhat overshadowed in posterity's estimation by his political and autobiographical texts, musical questions were a lifelong fascination for Rousseau. His work on music occupies a fifth of the total corpus of his works, spanning from almost his first publication (*Dissertation sur la musique moderne*, 1743) to his late writings on Gluck (e.g., *Extrait d'une réponse du petit faiseur à son prête-nom sur l'Orphée de M. le Chevalier Gluck* [1774?]).

Music scholars such as Charles Rosen (1971, 1975), Rose Rosengard Subotnik (1991, 1996), and others have shown that the Enlightenment and aspects of the "rationalization" of music, including modern notation, the circle of fifths, scale rationalization, and the harmonic chord system (octave, fifth, fourth) paved the way for the late eighteenth- and nineteenth-century establishment and domination of "classical style" and "sonata forms" in Western art musics. In a very recent paper, Katherine Walker (2017) suggests that Mozart's father Leopold was almost a child of the Enlightenment and that his biography and writings illustrate the thesis that the "enlightened Christianity" under which he was educated predated the Age of Enlightenment. Accordingly, his son Wolfgang Amadeus, in his maturity, and Beethoven later still in the eighteenth century—the generally acknowledged original "stars" of the classical and sonata form periods of Western art musics—were distinctly Enlightenment figures.

Although it is generally identified with the Counter-Enlightenment Western art musics, Romanticism has been strongly portrayed as an outcome of Enlightenment by the musicologist and psychologist Leonard B. Meyer in his book *Style and Music* (1989). According to Meyer, the "latest" (eighteenth-century and thereafter) Romanticism was based on "an unequivocal and uncompromising repudiation of a social order based on arbitrary, inherited class distinctions. ... [T]he roots of this Romanticism extended ... to the growing emphasis on the worth of the individual, the widened perspectives fostered by the discovery of new lands and cultures, and the dazzling achievements of the natural sciences. ... [I]ts driving force was a political and social radicalism that defined itself 'as the antithesis of feudal Christianity'" (164). He continues that the "revolution in thought [Romanticism] represented by the Enlightenment received enormous impetus from the convincing success of science, which had long since repudiated the authority of the Church and Scripture."

During the 1700s, the French population was divided into three “Estates.” The “First Estate” was the clergy of the Roman Catholic Church—less than 1% of the population; the “Second Estate” was the aristocracy, which held high office in government and was about 2% of the population; and the “Third Estate” was everyone else—the bourgeoisie (the middle class), the lower class, and peasant farmers—and comprised about 97% percent of the population. The “commoners” in the Third Estate were not treated as the equals of the individuals in the other two Estates. Indeed, the members of the First and Second Estates enjoyed special privileges, one of which was inclusion in the world of art musics. In other words, the Third Estate was barred from art musics beyond those heard in church.

This social inequality led to a buildup of resentment within the Third Estate and eventually to the French Revolution, the Declaration of the Rights of Man, and access to art musics, as well as to art, culture, and entertainment more generally. In other countries, the growth of the middle class, and its differentiation from the other classes, in turn gave rise to entirely new patterns of audiencing, the emergence of public concerts, new opportunities, and the improved status of musicians and music-related occupations and institutions (see Taruskin 2010, vol. 3; W. Weber 1975). I discuss these developments in some detail in chapter 1 in terms of changes in the production, distribution, and reception of musics. I examine the “bourgeois-ification” and “middlebrow-ization” of Western art musics—phenomena to which later chapters return.

The Counter-Enlightenment and Western Art Musics

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), identified earlier by Zeev Sternhell as one of the major anti-Enlightenment villains, is also widely regarded as a hero in the study and analysis of musics and for his trailblazing work on musics and their role in human societies. By coining the term “folk song,” and applying it to a class of global musical practices for the first time, the philosopher, theologian, and anthropologist established a new paradigm for recognizing and representing the relation of music to history. Folk song, Herder proposed, entered into history in counterpoint with history’s entry into folk song. He demonstrated that folk songs and other popular musics (and sometimes art musics) express—and, indeed, help foster and maintain—a plethora of religious, nationalist, ethnic, linguistic, and other individual and communal identities, all of which can be considered Counter-Enlightenment in nature. The folk songs which he collected and published in the seminal volumes *Alt Volkslieder*

(1774), *Volkslieder* (1778-79), *Der Cid* (1778), and *Stimmen der Völker in Liedern* (1807) formed at the confluence of time and space, hence accruing to a “moment of history in music.” Herder’s folk songs came from historical sources in the past and ethnographic encounter in the present, and in their common historical context they made possible new narrative paths in the future.

Herder’s theories of interpretation and translation both rest on a certain epoch-making insight of his. Whereas eminent Enlightenment philosopher-historians (Hume and Voltaire, for instance) had normally still held that, as Hume put it, “mankind are so much the same in all times and places that history informs us of nothing new or strange,” Herder discovered—or at least saw more clearly than anyone before him—that this was false. He realized, in other words, that peoples from different historical periods and cultures vary *tremendously* in their concepts, beliefs, values, (perceptual and affective) sensations, and so forth. He also recognized that similar, albeit usually less dramatic, variations occur even between individuals within a single period and culture. These positions are prominent in many of Herder’s works. Together they are called “his principle of *radical mental difference*.”

In his notes, which he never published himself, Herder explicitly described the challenge he was embracing as a scholar indebted to a global human community: “For this purpose I wish to collect data about the history of every historical moment, each evoking a picture of its own use, function, custom, burdens, and pleasures. Accordingly, I shall assemble everything I can, leading up to the present day, in order to put it to good use” (Herder and Bohlman 2017, 266). Herder’s moment of global encounter quickly and sweepingly left its impact on music, for among the data he collected were the songs of peoples throughout the world. Within four years, in 1773, he had created a new word to describe these songs: *Volkslieder*, or “folk songs.” As he gathered the songs, he began publishing them in collections in 1774, leading finally to an anthology of 194 songs, published in two volumes in 1778 and 1779, called simply *Volkslieder* (Herder 1778/1779). The influence of Herder’s work on folk songs was enormous—indeed, it was a paradigm shift in musical thought with global proportions. That influence changed the course of the global history of music forever.

Ethnomusicologist Philip V. Bohlman has compiled many of Herder’s writings on music and nationalism. In *Song Loves the Masses: Herder on Music and Nationalism* (Herder and Bohlman 2017), Bohlman asserts (xiv) that this is the music Herder would have written had he gathered the many strands of his musical thought into a single publication. Bohlman’s compilation, framed

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