To Andy, Anna, and my mother

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Nestled deep in the middle of Gillian Rose's essay "Athens and Jerusalem: A Tale of Three Cities" is a reproduction of a painting by Poussin entitled *Landscape with the Ashes of Phocion*. "Recently," Rose says, "I discovered a painting by Poussin which illustrates the unintended consequences of our substitution of the New Jerusalem for the missing analysis of the old Athens."[1] The painting, she tells us, is inspired by Plutarch's *Life of Phocion*. Phocion was an Athenian general and statesman who, despite a lifetime of public and political service, was ultimately accused of treason, forced to take hemlock, and denied burial. His body, Rose tells us, "was taken outside the city walls and burnt by a paid alien; his ashes left untended on the pyre."[2] The painting depicts Phocion's wife and a companion gathering Phocion's ashes in anticipation of giving them a proper resting place.

Rose first encountered Poussin's *Landscape with the Ashes of Phocion* through a television show called *Sister Wendy's Odyssey* that showcased the nun Sister Wendy and her love and interpretations of painting. However, Rose and Sister Wendy disagreed on how to interpret the painting: the gesture of the women, the backdrop of Athens in its architectural dominance, and the position of the women in relation to it. Sister Wendy, Rose tells us, interpreted "the wife bending down to scoop up the ashes as an act of perfect love."[3] According to this argument,

> The classical orders as such stand for the tyranny of the city of Athens. . . . In this presentation of the rational order in itself as unjust power, and the opposition of this domination to the pathos of redeeming love, I discerned

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1 Gillian Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 22.

2 Rose, *Mourning*, 23.

3 Ibid., 25.

> the familiar argument that all boundaries of knowledge and power, of soul
> and city, amount to illegitimate force and are to be surpassed by the new
> ethics of the unbounded community.[4]

Phocion's women, Sister Wendy's interpretation suggests, commit the ultimate act of ethical critique by refusing to engage the city and its structures, insisting instead upon the privacy and individuality of their sentimental love and sadness in the wake of the city's indifferent cruelty.

For Rose, Sister Wendy's reading effaces the philosophical and political character of the women's act as a public appeal to the city's norms of justice. As Rose says, "to oppose the act of redeeming love to the implacable domination of architectural and political order—here, pure, individual love to the impure injustice of the world—is completely to efface the politics of the painting."[5] Rose points to the women's physical proximity to the city and the architecture of Athens, which elegantly frames them. Athens is no sinister symbol of political tyranny and cruel insensitive dominion. Rather, confident in its structures and in the possibility that they may provide justice, Phocion's women perform not a private act but a very public and unsentimental rite of mourning. By taking up space and making itself visible, their rite wagers on the world as a place that can accommodate it—a place within which the women may present the claim implicit in their mourning, a place where their ethical line in the sand can be publicly acknowledged and generate a legislative response.

With this act, the women defend the rationality of their claim that Phocion's treatment was unjust and call for a legislative response. There ought to be, their action attests, a law against prohibiting a person's right to a proper burial. Phocion's women exercise self-conscious philosophical authority by justifying normative claims on the grounds of their contribution to the current worldly conditions within which they find themselves. They demonstrate the philosophical courage to boldly assert their normative claim as a justifiable hypothesis in light of the material conditions of the world in which they live.

No doubt Rose interprets Phocion's women in her own philosophical image, and no doubt Rose's philosophical self-awareness is a product of the history of modern Western intellectual reflection that she inherits. Stated otherwise, there is a backstory to Rose's deep appreciation for

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4   Ibid.
5   Ibid.

worldly conditions as the context within which philosophical reflection about norms occurs. More specifically, it is the story of the slow process by which modern Western intellectual culture came to terms with the scientific revolution and its valorization of natural knowledge over and against theological, ethical, and political discourse, what is commonly referred to as the "fact-value" or "nature-norm" divide, by apprehending the logical significance of both scientific and non-scientific knowledge, or what are understood as "fact" and "value" claims.

Nature and Norm draws inspiration from Rose's hard-earned interpretation of Phocion's women and recognizes its back-story in the specific intellectual trajectory of modern and contemporary Western Jewish and Christian thought. If Rose's philosophical courage emerges from the gradual process by which Western European thought comes to apprehend the significance of the material conditions within which communities live as the conditions for the justification of scientific and non-scientific claims, *Nature and Norm* offers a picture of how Jewish and Christian thought finally catches up with and participates in this same philosophical apprehension.

Nature and Norm: Judaism, Christianity, and the Theopolitical Problem is a book about the encounter between Jewish and Christian thought and the fact-value divide. The fact-value divide is the belief that statements of facts concerning the objective world alone may be considered true or false, whereas claims about values are subjective or strictly relative to those who hold them and are devoid of intelligibility or validity. Entranced by the new developments arising from natural science, scientists and philosophers alike began to take for granted that scientific knowledge offered the most accurate representation of reality and that only claims concerning the natural world could be considered potentially true or false.

Not an attempt to tear down the value of scientific inquiry to prop up theological discourse, *Nature and Norm* argues for a logic of discourse that gives ample space to both religious thought and scientific inquiry by dissolving the so-called "fact-value" binary. At its core sit three observations. First, a good deal of modern and contemporary Jewish and Christian thought has adhered to the logic of the fact-value distinction. Second, adherence to this logic has had calamitous results for Jewish and Christian thought, including an inability to articulate clear and meaningful claims, an inclination towards utopian theopolitical positions, a vulnerability to skepticism, a tendency for coercion, and an overall inability to advance effective platforms for theopolitical change. Finally, contemporary Jewish

and Christian thought needs a logical reorientation that would illuminate conceptual practices capable of issuing on-going and changing measures of the justifiability of claims derived from both natural and social orders of discourse.

In 1610 Galilei Galileo confirmed Copernicus's heliocentric model using a self-designed telescope. In 1620, Francis Bacon published *Novum Organum Scientiarum* (*New Instrument*), which introduced his observation-based method of scientific inquiry. In 1687 Isaac Newton published the *Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (*Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*), laying the foundations for classical mechanics. The rise of modern science sent shock waves through Europe and dramatically altered the contours and standards of Western thought, generating what Jonathan Israel has referred to as the "crisis of the European mind." In his classic text, *The Radical Enlightenment*, Israel states that,

> During the Middle Ages and the early modern age down to around 1650, western civilization was based on a largely shared core of faith, tradition, and authority. By contrast, after 1650, everything, no matter how fundamental or deeply rooted, was questioned . . . challenged or replaced by startlingly different concepts generated by the New Philosophy and what may still be usefully termed the Scientific Revolution.[6]

Undoubtedly, those of us living in the early twenty-first century are the beneficiaries of these shock waves and the fruits they have borne in medical science, chemistry, biology and technology. Nonetheless, it is the central claim of this book that this crisis of the European mind has reverberated throughout modern western Jewish and Christian thought since the seventeenth century and continues until our current time.

According to Israel, the crisis of the European mind arises from the impact of the scientific revolution upon philosophical thinking.

> It was unquestionably the rise of powerful new philosophical systems, rooted in the scientific advances of the early seventeenth century and especially the mechanistic views of Galileo, which chiefly generated that vast *Kulturkampf* between traditional, theologically sanctioned ideas about Man, God and the

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6   Jonathan Israel, *The Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650–1750* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 3–4.

universe and secular, mechanistic conceptions which stood independently
of any theological sanction.[7]

Israel's book offers an exquisitely detailed documentation of the scientifically
primed "philosophical radicalism" of the early European Enlightenment
and the challenge this new picture of reality and its "mechanistic concep-
tions" posed to traditional ideas about God, authority, and morality. Most
importantly for my purposes, Israel's project attests to the logical valori-
zation of these new ideas or claims over and against non-scientific claims
concerning God, morality, and politics, or what has come to be known as
the fact-value divide.

Israel makes a convincing case for identifying Baruch Spinoza as the
primary exemplar of the fact-value divide insofar as his "general philosophy
was profoundly influenced by his conception of science [and science con-
stituted for him] the only certain and reliable criterion of truth we possess."[8]
According to Israel, Spinoza's thought is transformative because he explic-
itly maintains that, "the laws science demonstrates through experiment
and mathematical calculation are universally valid and the sole criterion
of truth."[9]

The import of identifying logical validity with scientific knowledge for
the logical status of non-scientific claims is clear. Either one considers them
thinly veiled claims about the natural world or one dismisses them as log-
ically invalid**.** On the one hand, therefore, Spinoza "seeks natural causes
for every phenomenon which has impressed or frightened men."[10] On the
other hand, Spinoza also insists that some phenomena have no place in the
natural order of things and that claims about them therefore have no logical
validity. Israel offers Spinoza's treatment of miracles as an example.

> The discussion of miracles in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* vividly
> illustrates the centrality of scientific criteria and modes of explanation in the
> overall structure of Spinoza's system. . . . Nothing [for Spinoza] happens or
> exists beyond Nature's laws and hence there can be no miracles; and those
> that are believed, or alleged, to have occurred, in fact had natural causes
> which at the time men were unable to grasp.[11]

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7   Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*, 14.
8   Ibid., 242.
9   Ibid., 244.
10 Ibid., 243.
11 Ibid.

However, miracles are not the only phenomena that have no place in the natural order of things. In both the *Theologico-Political Treatise* and the *Ethics*, Spinoza asserts that there are no values in nature either.[12] Normative claims derive from the subjective human experiences of nature and its laws and are therefore relative to the individuals who have these experiences. Ethics, politics, and religion are discourses that express these kinds of claims and different ways of organizing and managing them. Consequently, they cannot satisfy the logical standard of adequate knowledge or the scientifically determined criterion of truth.[13] Certainly, as we will see, Spinoza is not the only thinker whose work exemplifies the fact-value divide, nor do all thinkers influenced by the fact-value divide agree on how knowledge of nature is achieved. However, regardless of whether scientific facts arise through empirical observation or by way of *a priori* natural laws, the fact-value divide presupposes that knowledge of nature is the logical standard of "true knowledge." In the shadow of this confidence, theopolitical or normative claims—claims whose subject matter is theology, ethics, or politics—are excluded or reduced away.

Immanuel Kant—an unabashed Enlightenment cheerleader for the power of reason—recognized these implications of Spinoza's thought. Kant expressed a deep concern for the potential crisis of the same Enlightenment

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12 For example, Spinoza says, "For this reason we could not conceive sin to exist in the state of nature, nor imagine God as a judge punishing man's transgressions; but we supposed all things to happen according to the general laws of universal nature, there being no difference between pious and impious, between him that was pure . . . and him that was impure, because there was no possibility either of justice or charity." Benedict de Spinoza, *A Theologico-Political Treatise*, trans. R. H. M. Elwes (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), 246. And, as Michael Rosenthal states, "a common procedure to address questions of value is to first define the meaning of the good, then develop a normative ethical theory based on this idea . . . Spinoza seems to have reversed the order. He thinks that there is no truly independent basis of the good. . . . Spinoza's own idea of natural law is value neutral." Earlier in the same essay Rosenthal states that, "somewhat surprisingly, Spinoza rejects the idea that anything in nature is intrinsically good." Michael Rosenthal, "Politics and Ethics in Spinoza: The Problem of Normativity," in *Essays on Spinoza's Ethical Theory*, ed. Matthew J. Kisner and Andrew Youpa (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 86. This claim seems to conflict with Spinoza's thoroughgoing insistence upon the highest good of the intellectual love of God. Nonetheless, these ideas, Rosenthal argues are "counterfactual guides to action and not true descriptions of things" (Rosenthal, "Politics and Ethics," 100).

13 Defense of these claims requires a careful analysis of the function of ethics in Spinoza's *Ethics* and the function of religion and politics in the *Theologico-Political Treatise.* My discussion of this claim appears in chapter two and draws heavily from the work of Donald Rutherford and Michael Rosenthal.

if and when reason was used to undermine traditional beliefs and social norms and associated this crisis with Spinoza's thought. Left unchecked, reason could lead to "materialism, fatalism, [and/or] atheism."[14] It could, in other words, revert to Spinozism.[15] Ultimately, the rise of scientific materialism led to the inscription of Spinoza's fact-value divide onto the dominant academic distinction between *Naturwissenschaften* and *Geisteswissenschaften*,[16] and neither Jewish nor Christian thought was immune to its influence. As Timothy Reiss maintains, "scientific discourse was to remain the model and exemplar of all discourses of truth—of all knowledge with few doubts until the last third of the nineteenth century and, even with increasing attacks, until the present."[17]

Most often, the notion that value statements are excluded from "the domain of rational discourse"[18] is associated with a philosophical school known as logical positivism. As Hilary Putnam explains, "according to the positivists, in order to be knowledge, ethical 'sentences' would have to be either analytic, which they manifestly are not, or else 'factual.' And their confidence that they could not be 'factual' . . . derived from their confidence that they knew exactly what a fact was."[19] Like Spinoza, the logical positivists took for granted the identification of truth with true knowledge about the objective world.[20] In the *Tractatus*, Ludwig Wittgenstein expresses the logical positivist's account of the world as a realm of facts without meaning.

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14 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), B xxxv.

15 See Omri Boehm, *Kant's Critique of Spinoza* (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 2014).

16 For a helpful discussion of the intensification of scientific materialism and corresponding development of *Geisteswissenchaft* in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Rudolph A. Makkreel and Sebastian Luft, "The Status of the Human Cultural Sciences," in *The Routledge Companion to Nineteenth Philosophy,* ed. Dean Moyar (New York: Routledge, 2012), 554–598.

17 Timothy Reiss, *The Discourse of Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018), 37.

18 Hilary Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 17.

19 Putnam, *The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy*, 21.

20 In *The Unity of Science*, Rudolph Carnap offers the prototypical fact-value account. "[A]ll statements belonging to metaphysics, regulative ethics and epistemology . . . are unscientific . . . and [in] the Viennese Circle, we are accustomed to describe such statements as nonsense. . . . [W]e do not intend to assert the impossibility of associating any conceptions or images with these logically invalid statements. Conceptions can be associated with any arbitrarily compounded series of words; and metaphysical statements are richly evocative of associations and feelings both in authors and readers." See Rudolph Carnap, *The Unity of Science* (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Hubner, 1934), 22.

"The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world, everything is at it is and everything happens as it does happen. . . . In it no value exists."[21] But since for the early Wittgenstein, as Omri Boehm explains, "talk of what is outside the world is meaningless"[22] and since in this objective world, no values exist, it follows that there is no potential truth to value claims. As Robert A. Harris states, "the positivists [also] rejected all talk about values (ethics, morals, religion, philosophy) not only as 'references without foundation' but as meaningless or 'non-cognitive' babble."[23]

In the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, G. W. F. Hegel describes this prioritization of the logical status of natural scientific claims as the privileging of Substance over Subject. Such a position neglects subjectivity both as the subject matter of knowledge (that is, human "values") and as the activity of the knower, or the vantage point of those who take up and live with objective knowledge. In these terms, the "fact-value divide" is the assumption that the standard of truth for all knowledge derives from our knowledge of substance, the physical and so-called "objective world", or as Timothy Reiss describes it, "a way of conceptualizing the world that 'marks a total distancing of the mind from the world.'"[24]

The fact-value divide has undoubtedly undergone damaging criticism by philosophers and scientists. As Robert A. Harris notes, "positivism's claim that 'only statements of [objective] facts have meaning' was a claim not subject to [objective verification] and thus, by its own definition . . . had no meaning. Thus was the philosophical basis for positivism refuted."[25] A long line of thinkers as diverse as William James, Leo Strauss, and Thomas Kuhn have demonstrated the extent to which "the practice of science involves much more than the compilation of self-evident facts."[26] Nonetheless, despite this pushback, as Putnam says, "the idea that 'value judgments are subjective' is a piece of philosophy that has gradually come to be accepted by many people as if it were common sense"[27] and this is no

21 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. C. K. Ogden (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1922), 87.
22 Boehm, *Kant's Critique of Spinoza*, xv.
23 Robert Harris, "A Summary Critique of the Fact-Value Dichotomy," accessed May 10, 2020, http://www.virtualsalt.com/int/factvalue.pdf.
24 Timothy Reiss, *Discourse of Modernity*, 140.
25 Harris, "A Summary Critique," 2.
26 Ibid., 3.
27 Putnam, *Collapse of the Fact/Value*, 1.

less the case among Jewish and Christian thinkers who continue to assert arbitrarily determined ethical and theological claims.

Certainly, I am not the first to take note of the influence of scientific naturalism and the attending logical prioritization of natural scientific claims over and against theopolitical claims upon modern and contemporary Jewish and Christian thought. In *God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars*, Benjamin Lazier tells a new story about inter-war and post-war Jewish and Christian theology as polarized between a this-worldly incarnationalism and a return to naturalism characteristic of Strauss and Schmitt on the one hand and the neo-gnostic acosmism of the *Krisis* theologians, Barth, Rosenzweig and Gogarten on the other hand. In this lively review, Lazier categorizes thinkers as critics or defenders of the thematic contents of Spinozistic philosophy. "For a variety of reasons," he asserts, "the interwar period witnessed an explosion of interest in Spinoza."[28] During this time,

> the Spinoza-gnostic rivalry [manifests itself] in one of its purest forms. Barth and his minions count as the theological expression of a sentiment that insisted man drain his cup to its dregs. . . . But for many, it offered an overly bleak outlook on the world. . . . This very fact made Spinoza's revival important. . . . In its depth and breadth, Spinoza's revival . . . outstripped by far the gnostic recrudescence.[29]

In Lazier's estimation, the force of Spinoza's influence at this time even pitted theologically minded thinkers like Schmitt and Barth against one another. As Lazier explains, "it should perhaps come as no surprise that interwar Catholics . . . would invoke Spinoza in the name of banishing once and for all the bugbear that would not go away. . . . The Catholic (and Spinozist) penchant for inclusion . . . stood in sharp contrast to the demand the crisis theologians laid upon man to decide—either for the world or for God."[30] And if Lazier concedes that, "Schmitt . . . did [not] expressly mobilize Spinoza to contest the gnostic spirit, . . ."[31] his thought, unlike Barth's, could be associated with the Spinozistic focus on this world.

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28 Benjamin Lazier, *God Interrupted: Heresy and the European Imagination between the World Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 78.
29 Ibid., 79.
30 Ibid., 80.
31 Ibid., 81.

Nonetheless, Lazier's analysis overlooks key points of overlap between the thinkers hereby profiled—points of overlap that I maintain can be best explained not by an assessment of their response to the contents of Spinoza's philosophy but by an account of their appropriation of its logic.

Indeed, the best evidence of a thinker's appropriation of the fact-value paradigm is the arbitrary anchoring of the thought in question. From the vantage point of the fact-value divide, knowledge is valid only when reducible to scientific terms. Claims that are irreducible to these terms, such as those acquired in the humanities, lack a proper ground and therefore register as arbitrary and vulnerable to skepticism. *Nature and Norm* argues that arbitrarily anchored claims appear in significant portions of the modern canon of Christian and Jewish thought. The failure of Jewish and Christian thinkers to identify their adherence to the logic of the fact-value divide, in turn, perpetuates a range of negative outcomes.

The appropriation of the fact-value divide also accounts for unexpected similarities between thinkers whose thematic positions vary greatly and produces a range of predictable problems in the thought of these same thinkers. Consequently, the analysis presented in *Nature and Norm* is, first and foremost, diagnostic. I first discovered the influence of the fact-value divide upon modern and contemporary Jewish and Christian thought as a result of an unexpected overlap between the theological realism in in the philosophical theology of one of post-modern Judaism's theological stars, Franz Rosenzweig, and the theological skepticism in the bright light of the liberal, philosophical enlightenment, Immanuel Kant. In chapter one, I describe an unexpected vulnerability to skepticism in Rosenzweig's and Kant's accounts of theopolitical discourse and argue that their shared indebtedness to the fact-value paradigm offers a plausible explanation for it.

Developing the conclusions of this case study, chapter one then launches a conceptual analysis of how recognition of the appropriation of the nature-norm divide offers a new and effective theory for understanding how much of modern Jewish and Christian thought functions or, more accurately, does not function. I discuss four major types of problems that emerge from the attempt to present theopolitical claims within the framework of the nature-norm divide: meaninglessness, acosmism (inability to relate to other worldly claims), pragmatic ineffectiveness, and dogmatism. This constellation of symptoms signals appropriation of the fact-value paradigm.

As noted earlier, the signature mark of a body of thought influenced by the fact-value divide is the arbitrary anchoring of its claims. Jewish and Christian thinkers who appropriate it will inevitably maintain a logical distinction between fact discourse and value discourse, such that the former is taken to exemplify the standard of objective intelligibility. Theological, political, and ethical claims, consequently, refer to an area of content that sits outside of and is other than the sphere of what is considered objectively intelligible.

Consequently, Jewish and Christian theopolitical claims remain haunted by the shadow of skepticism. To say, however, that theopolitical claims are unknowable is also to suggest that they are unintelligible, devoid of any stable meaning. Immanuel Kant's postulates of God, the highest good, and the immortality of the soul serve as appropriate examples. As well, Rosenzweig's inability to determine a substantive difference between claims concerning a wholly other God and claims concerning subjective religious desire also exemplify this problem.

Since to determine a claim as meaningless is to maintain that it holds no clear or determinable relation to the things we consider knowable, meaningless claims are also inevitably acosmic (the failure to identify the relation and/or ramifications of one's claims on the world). Tendencies towards such acosmism appear in early twentieth-century Jewish and Christian forms of theological gnosticism exemplified in the messianic discourse of thinkers like Jacob Taubes and Giorgio Agamben.

The acosmic character of theological claims, in turn, entails their pragmatic ineffectiveness, their inability to operate as reliable roadmaps for action. Efforts to deploy them pragmatically instead result in tragedy or polemicism. The former is evident in the work of thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas and the latter in the new Pauline theology of thinkers like Alain Badiou.[32]

A closer examination of these four symptoms also indicates differences between the ways Jewish and Christian thinkers have appropriated the fact-value divide. In chapters two, three, and four, I outline three forms of the appropriation of the fact-value divide that also constitute three

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32   For an account of the tragic ineffectuality of Levinasian and Derridean ethics see Rose, *Mourning Becomes the Law*. For an examination of the polemical thrust of the work of Alain Badiou see Sarah Hammerschlag, "Bad Jews, Authentic Jews, Figural Jews: Badiou and the Politics of Exemplarity," in *Judaism, Liberalism and Political Theology*, ed. Randi Rashkover and Martin Kavka (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014).

primary strategies that Jewish and Christian thinkers have deployed to contend with it. I call these *acceptance*, *redescription*, and *external critique*. By "acceptance" I mean presupposing the self-evident validity of factual claims over and against theopolitical (value) claims. By "redescription" I mean positing a theopolitical reality that cannot be reduced to the terms of factual knowledge claims while nonetheless recognizing the latter as the standard of logical validity. This theopolitical reality is invoked as an irreducible "more," but this appeal to the "more" functions only to redescribe the fact-value paradigm rather than contest it. Lastly, by "external critique" I mean critiquing the logical self-evidence of fact discourse but failing to provide an alternative account of logical validity, without which theopolitical claims remain susceptible to arbitrary anchoring.

In the end, none of these three strategies adequately resolves the theopolitical problem. We know *that* they fail, since they all manifest the arbitrary anchoring of theopolitical claims. Moreover, we know *why* they fail to adequately resolve the theopolitical problem, since none begins with an admission of the problem and of the potential unintelligibility of Jewish and Christian claims. Admitting the theopolitical problem requires recognizing the failure of one's own thought to render certain key claims intelligible. It requires the thinker to perform an immanent critique of her own system, which acknowledges that the theopolitical problem arises out of her method of thinking and not from scientific naturalism's incomplete description of reality. It means recognizing that Jewish and Christian claims are coterminous with the theopolitical problem, not an antidote to it.

In chapter five, I offer a detailed analysis of how Jewish and Christian thinkers caught in the grip of the fact-value paradigm can respond. The first step is to gain a proper appreciation of the goal of the analysis. If the problem introduced by the fact-value divide is the apparently unbridgeable chasm between scientific discourse about the world and theopolitical discourse about human affairs, the goal of this analysis is *to resolve this divide*, not to deny the validity of one of these forms of discourse. The answer to the theopolitical problem will not arise from a theological critique of scientific naturalism, but rather when Jewish and Christian thinkers exercise a deeper philosophical apprehension of how their claims relate to the world. The goal is to find a way to sustain the modern Jewish and Christian appreciation for the fruits of the scientific revolution without sacrificing the logical validity of Jewish and Christian thought in the process.

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