Contents

Preface

The Turkish alphabet is admirably clear in its spelling. The consonants are mostly pronounced as in English or German, and the vowels mostly as in Spanish or Italian, with the following unusual letters:

- C/c is pronounced like the j in "jelly"
- Ç/ç is the ch in "church"
- ğ is silent but lengthens the previous vowel
- I/ı is a short, dull sound much like the i in "cousin"
- İ/i is the vowel "i" in Spanish or Italian, that is, like the English ee in "cheese"
- J/j is found mostly in loanwords from French and, like the French j, is pronounced "zh" like the s in "pleasure" or "treasure"
- Ö/ö is pronounced as in German, or the French eu in peu
- Ş/ş is the sh in "ship"
- Ü/ü is pronounced as in German, or the French u in rue

In this book, the spelling of personal and place names follow the spellings current in Turkey today, thus "Erdoğan" and "İstanbul" rather than "Erdogan" and "Istanbul." For the period before the founding of the Turkish Republic, the then current names in European languages are used with the present

names appended, for example, Smyrna (İzmir) or Adrianople (Edirne). Constantinople (Kostantiniyye in Ottoman Turkish) became mandatorily replaced by İstanbul only in the Turkish Republic. Nevertheless, we will use İstanbul throughout in the context of either the Ottoman Empire or the Republic of Turkey. For places which are known today under two different names, as for example some cities in Cyprus, both designations are used, for example, Greek/Turkish Famagusta/Gazimağusa.

Abbreviations are used after the first usage of the abbreviated phrase in each chapter. For Turkish institutions and parties, for example, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), only the Turkish abbreviations will be used, as there are no established short forms for these organizations in English or other European languages. For all terms, the translation will be given first, with the Turkish original following parenthetically.

Before the mandatory introduction of surnames on 1 January 1935, Muslims in Turkey only used given names (if often with appended descriptive epithets, conveying, for example, their origin in a city or region). For the period before 1935, we append their later-adopted surname in parenthesis, for example, Ali Fuat (Cebesoy). Because we speak so often of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, a different rule applies to him: before 1935, he is called Mustafa Kemal, after 1935, Atatürk. Titles like pasha (generals and dignitaries of high standing) are only used, if at all, before 1935. Names from Ottoman times are sometimes spelled slightly differently from the contemporary Turkish norm, for example, (Ottoman) Abdülhamid instead of (Modern Turkish) Abdülhamit, in order to appropriately reflect the Ottoman spelling in the Arabic alphabet. The spelling reform of 1 January 1929, that is, the transition from the Arabic to the Latin alphabet, introduced a number of diacritical marks, like a circumflex on some instances of the vowels a, i, and u, to reflect long vowels in Arabic, as in *Resmî Gazete* (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey) or Millî İstihbarat Teşkilâtı (National Intelligence Organization, i.e., the Turkish secret service). In cases where these institutions still use these old-fashioned spellings today, we adopt them as well. Terms from the religious tradition of Islam, which are almost universally derived from Arabic terms (one of the few exceptions in Turkish is the use of the Persian *namaz* for ritual prayer), appear here as in modern Turkish usage, for example *mezhep* for one of the legal schools of thought in Islamic jurisprudence (instead of the correct standard Arabic transliteration *ma<u>dh</u>hab*). Islamic religious terms for which there exists a standard English spelling are excepted, like Hajj, Ramadan, or Shari'a.

All references in the footnotes are short form; the complete entries can be found in the bibliography at the end of the book.

The manuscript of this book (its original version was published in German with C. H. Beck) was completed in March 2021. Readers may miss hints to the latest developments and incidents, such as Turkey's position towards Russia's war on the Ukraine since February 2022, but in order to preserve the integrity of the text the 2021 version has been kept unaltered in this book.

Introduction

Turkey is a strong country. It is a member of the G20, the forum of states with most of the world's largest economies. Turkish Airlines (Türk Hava Yolları), which as recently as the 1980s was a carrier with a limited range, today serves more countries in the world than any other airline—by a wide margin. After the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) assumed power in 2002, the country experienced an impressive economic boom. Turkey fields the second-largest army in NATO; and, with the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, its geostrategic importance has only grown. Turkey is a key player in numerous burning political crises of our day, like how to deal with the collapsing order of the Middle East and with what means Europe should reply to migration pressures from Africa and Asia. The Turkish-descended diaspora is one of the most significant in Europe. Enabled by modern mass media and transportation, these millions of people convey political conditions in Turkey into the heart of Europe—and vice versa. Turkey's land area exceeds that of France, the largest Western European country by territory. Thanks to its dynamic population growth, it currently has well over eighty million inhabitants and has meanwhile surpassed Germany, the most populous country in the European Union.

Turkey is a difficult country. Relations between Turkey and Europe have always been fickle and are burdened on both sides by reservations rooted in

the politics of identity. If admitted to the European Union (which is barely imaginable at the moment), Turkey would lay claim to a role commensurate not only with its political but its demographic weight. The immense misgivings which Great Britain, shaped by its imperial past, had about the European Union until its exit in January 2020 would be nothing as compared to those which would be held by Turkey as a member state. Into the early 2010s, Turkey was considered the Islamic country which stood for the compatibility of democracy and Islam in exemplary fashion. Its path to authoritarian rule from the late 2000s has dimmed its reputation as a role model, however. In addition, in light of Turkey's new self-consciousness, relations have become more complicated: on the European side, old certainties of superiority are entangled with new discomfitures; on the Turkish side, new imperial ambitions overlie old anticolonial reflexes.

Turkey is a magnificent country. The geographic and cultural variety of this expansive land is impressive. Turkey encompasses classical Asia Minor, one of the historically and culturally richest regions of the world. It is the successor of the Ottoman Empire, one of the greatest premodern empires, which was destroyed at the end of the First World War, making the creation of a new Turkey, the Republic of Turkey founded in 1923, simultaneously necessary and possible.

The idea, so enthusiastically deployed in European depictions, of Turkey as a bridge between "East" and "West" is not a popular image in Turkey, as in it Turkey appears too much like an object to be used. Today, Turkey prefers to see itself as a "pivotal state." It is a country conjoined with Europe—but not exclusively so. The vitality of Turkish society far exceeds that of the countries of Western Europe. In contrast to many Arab states, whose population growth and surfeit of young people has become a burden to them, Turkey can credit its demographic dynamism, which will continue into the late 2020s, for the development of a large internal market.[1] The restlessness and liveliness of Turkish metropolises is occasionally overwhelming.

Turkey is a torn country. It is not always an advantage to be a bridge between cultures and different regions of the world or even to be a "pivotal state" in a region. Turkey cannot always justify its claim to connect different worlds, even in its own society. Turks point with pride to their history, which reaches back far beyond the Turkish Republic and the Ottoman Empire, but this rich inheritance has also endowed them with difficult legacies, like the

1 İçduygu, "Demography," 333. Per UNICEF, *World's Children*, 192, population growth in the decade 2008–2018 averaged 1.5% and will sink to 0.7% in 2018–2030.

animosity, already well-developed in the nineteenth century, between a camp who understand themselves in secular terms and one which sees itself primarily in light of their religious-conservative commitments. Because these camps do not agree on what the history of their own country represents, they have consistently failed to reach an accord on how this history might serve as the foundation of a national self-understanding. Without any such clear idea, relations have consequently been fraught with the large minorities of Alevis and Kurds; to date, the sole solution the country could and has desired to offer is assimilation into the Turkish Sunni majority. The Kurds, who are not Turks, ethnically or linguistically, and the Alevis, who are not Sunnis, have not found this solution attractive, let alone persuasive.

It seemed that features about cosmopolitan İstanbul were on German television almost every night in the early 2010s (such stories always spotlighted a very small part of İstanbul, specifically the city within its borders of around 1900). Nowadays, the authoritarianism of the Turkish government is the hot topic, though without the appeal of the city of İstanbul and the country having entirely given way. Turkey is in any case a country rarely met with indifference, neither in Turkey nor abroad—a sign that it has distinctive qualities of character and is far from the margins of world politics.

Turkey: Territory, Borders, Neighbors

The fundamentals and borders of the Republic of Turkey recognized by international law are found in the Treaty of Lausanne, which was concluded on 24 July 1923 between Turkey and the victors of the First World War, foremost France and Great Britain. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) followed a few months later on 29 October 1923. Since Lausanne, the borders of Turkey have remained fundamentally the same—with the exception of the region called Hatay around the cities of Antakya and İskenderun which fell to Turkey in 1939. The century-long existence of the Republic of Turkey within the borders of Lausanne supports the conclusion that the state system of the Middle East in the twentieth century, despite its reputation as a region of crises, has been more stable than that of Europe.[2]

Its geographic composition lends Turkey the appearance of a compact unit. With a coastline of 3,371 miles (not including its islands) compared to

2 Gelvin, *New Middle East*, 7.

land borders of 1,709 miles, Turkey is a state whose borders are principally maritime. To the north, it's bordered by the Black Sea, to the west by the Aegean, and to the south, the Mediterranean. In addition, the Sea of Marmara communicates with the Aegean through the Straits of the Dardanelles and with the Black Sea through those of the Bosporus. İstanbul sits at the upper end of the Sea of Marmara, that is, at the southern egress of the Bosporus, on one of the most important shipping lanes in the world. The territory of Turkey, encompassing 305,422 square miles, is thereby "a territory of impressive coherence in area and outline, without extreme projections and constrictions of its borders."[3] On the other hand, the west-to-east slope of Turkey catches the eye. West Anatolia was already the core area of the state in late Ottoman times,[4] in the early years of the Republic the eastern regions still seemed like a foreign body. For the Turkish elites living in the West Anatolian big cities, Southeast Anatolia was more than just geographically distant. One would rather roam the great wide world than "through wild Kurdistan." It was—and remains—in parts an area of unpopular probation for doctors, officials, teachers, and security forces.

Only a little more than three percent (9,159 square miles) of the land area of Turkey lies in the region of Thrace west of the straits and therefore "in Europe." The rest lies in Anatolia, also called Asia Minor. The term "Asia Minor" originally was applied only to the western portion of the Asiatic part of Turkey—the peninsula protruding from the Asian land mass between the Black Sea, Sea of Marmara, and Mediterranean. The watershed between the Kızılırmak and Euphrates rivers or, alternatively, a line between the cities İskenderun (on the Mediterranean) and Trabzon (on the Black Sea) divides Asia Minor proper from the regions lying further east. By "Anatolia," the Greeks originally meant the mainland east of the Aegean. In the eleventh and twelfth century, this term was adopted by the Turks, but considerably broadened. This book uses the term "Anatolia" rather than Asia Minor. Keeping with current Turkish usage, Anatolia (Anadolu) connotes the entire Asian region of the Republic of Turkey.

Turkey still belongs to Europe in terms of cultural geography. The lack of large, defined areas of territory rendered uninhabitable by physical or climatic conditions conspicuously differentiates Anatolia from Iran, the Arabian

3 Hütteroth, *Türkei*, 18.

4 Per Kreiser, "Kernraum," the density of religious foundations (evkaf) can serve to determine the core Ottoman territories in Western Anatolia and Southeastern Europe.

Peninsula, or Egypt.[5] The geographic division of Europe from Asia by the two straits is in any case a convention: the Dardanelles and Bosporus are flooded river valleys, and from İstanbul on the European shore, one looks upon the other shore as from Manhattan to Brooklyn.

Due to its geographic position, Turkey might boast a climate comparable to Portugal or southern Italy. The largest part of Turkey, however, lies too high for a subtropical climate. The average elevation of Turkey is 3,707 feet (the Iberian Peninsula, which is in certain respects comparable to Anatolia, has an average elevation of 2,100 feet). A second characteristic of Anatolia is numerous orogenic belts of mountains, almost traversing the entire landscape, which leads to a chambering of the land into massifs and mountain ranges with basins (*ova*) of various orders of magnitude lying between them. Ova, like the southeastern European polje, denotes a flat lowland that is at least partially surrounded by higher terrain. A third characteristic shaping Anatolia is Inner Anatolia's being cut off from the sea by mountain massifs rising immediately behind the coastline, running parallel to the seashore, and in places towering over 10,000 feet. The Pontic Mountains run along the Black Sea coast and the Taurus Mountains along the south coast. Only in the west, on the Aegean coast, is the transition to the Inner Anatolian highland distinctly set back in the interior, and the land falls off less precipitously. A dry continental climate on the Inner Anatolian highland stands in contrast to the subtropical climate along the slender coastlines.[6] The separation of Inner Anatolia from the coasts and its partial, difficult accessibility in the eastern regions have shaped its economic conditions and political history over centuries.

The regional appellations current in Turkey do not reflect the historical variety of the country. You'll only find ancient territorial names like Lydia (west of İzmir) or Pamphylia (the region around today's Antalya) in cultural travel guides. Cappadocia (Kapadokya), as an important tourist destination, is an established term in Turkey, just like Thrace (Trakya) is a designation for the European territory of Turkey. However, the former Byzantine placenames live on in many city names, above all in Central Anatolia, as in Amasya (Amaseia), Antalya (Attaleia), Bergama (Pergamum), Kayseri (Caesareia), Konya (Iconium), Malatya (Melitene), or Sivas (Sebasteia).[7] Almost all of the provinces in today's Turkey take their names from their respective

5 Hütteroth, *Türkei*, 262.

6 Ibid., 20ff. Hale, *Modern Turkey*, 5, notes incidentally with justification that Inner Anatolia is so mountainous that speaking of one "Inner Anatolian highland" is actually not apposite.

7 See the map in Vryonis, *Decline of Medieval Hellenism*, between pages 14 and 15.

administrative seats. A division into large regions which do not necessarily describe physically or cultural-geographically coherent regions is in wide use, for example in weather reports. These regions are: the Aegean (Ege), Marmara (Marmara), Mediterranean (Akdeniz), Black Sea (Karadeniz), as well as Inner Anatolia (İç Anadolu), East Anatolia (Doğu Anadolu), and Southeast Anatolia (Güneydoğu Anadolu).

Turkey borders eight neighboring countries: Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (though only its Nakhchivan exclave), Iran, Iraq, and Syria. These neighbors differ from Turkey with regard to language, ethnicity, and religion—and often all three at once. The two Southeastern European neighbors of Turkey,[8] Bulgaria and Greece, emphasize as the foundation of their national identity their belonging to Orthodox Christendom. Both countries have Turkish minorities. The Turkish minority of Bulgaria comprises about a tenth of the population and is represented by its own party in the Bulgarian parliament. In addition, there are up to a quarter-million Pomaks (Slavic-speaking Muslims), especially in the south Bulgarian Rhodope Mountains. In Greek West Thrace, an area that stretches from about Xanthi to the Greco-Turkish border, there live over a hundred thousand Muslims, with Pomaks and Roma represented alongside Turks, who are the largest individual group.[9] The presence of Turkish minorities in Greece and Bulgaria has repeatedly been the cause of quarrels between Turkey and these countries: because of the Turkish claim to protect them, because of attempts at a national homogenization policy by Bulgaria, and because of the ruling idea in Bulgaria and Greece's public memories that their peoples suffered for centuries under the "Ottoman yoke," that is, oppressive, almost destructive, Ottoman rule.[10] Territorial disputes in the Aegean and the unresolved question of Cyprus additionally burden Greco-Turkish relations.

Turkey's relations with its northeastern neighbors, Georgia and Armenia, both successor states of the Soviet Union, are chilly. Georgia sees itself, as does Armenia, as an island of Christendom in an otherwise majority-Muslim

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8 In this book, "Southeastern Europe" is used throughout, even when "the Balkans" might be appropriate in places, above all for the areas of Southeastern Europe formerly ruled by the Ottomans. A convincing explication and delineation of the terms "Balkans" and "Southeastern Europe" may be found in Sundhaussen, "Europa balcanica," as well as Sundhaussen, "Balkan."

9 Stieger, *Vergessene Minderheiten*, 115, 151.

10 On this, see Höpken, "Türkische Minderheiten"; Hering, "Osmanenzeit;" Höpken, "Kulturkonflikt und Repression." For the situation after 1990: Gangloff, "Politique balkanique," 350ff.

Caucasus, and its predecessor kingdoms had a fraught history of relations with the Ottoman Empire. It maintains, however, pragmatic contact with Turkey.[11] Turkey, in turn, is forced to rely on Georgia as a land bridge to Azerbaijan, owing to its poor relations with Armenia. To cite just one example, for that reason, the petroleum pipeline that opened in 2006 from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan runs across Georgia. Armenian-Turkish relations remain poisoned to this day. Adding to the burden of the genocide of the Anatolian Armenians during the First World War, is the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which Turkey has taken Azerbaijan's side.[12] The land border between Armenia and Turkey remains closed to this day. Azerbaijan, linguistically, ethnically, culturally, and politically affiliated with Turkey, possesses no direct land connection to Turkey. There is, however, a narrow corridor to the Nakhchivan (in Azeri: Naxçıvan) Autonomous Republic from the Turkish province of Iğdır immediately north of Mount Ararat. Nakhchivan, an Azerbaijani exclave, is surrounded by Iran, Armenia, and Turkey (albeit only sharing a ten-and-a-half-mile border with Turkey).

While the borders of Turkey were, in general, set at the beginning of the twentieth century, its borders with Persia, today called Iran, were consolidated in the seventeenth century, even when the Ottoman Empire and Persia continued to fight over a multitude of conflicts, principally over control of the areas currently comprising northern Iraq. The Perso-Ottoman, or today's Iranian-Turkish, border was and is barely disputed, because it runs through lightly settled areas and mountain ranges. Iran and Turkey have contradictory hegemonic claims in the broader region, a fact which has emerged clearly, for example, in the Syrian War ongoing since 2011. Despite Sunni-Shi'ite antagonism, the two states are not fundamentally hostile to each other.[13]

The territories of today's Iraq and Syria were under Ottoman rule from the early sixteenth century until 1918. Following their agenda as "Arab national states," Iraqi and Syrian national historiography and politics of public memory

11 See Waal, *Caucasus*, 149, 249, on the strong antipathy to Turkey among the Georgian population.

12 Ghaplanyan, *Post-Soviet Armenia*, 152-175. At the beginning of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict in 1988, while still under Soviet rule, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh was that of an "autonomous region" within the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan with a clear Armenian majority population.

13 See for example International Crisis Group, *Turkey and Iran*.

(here resembling those of Greece and Bulgaria) describe the four centuries of Ottoman rule as a time of decline. In addition to this basic perspective, new opportunities for conflict have arisen, like the question of water, which is critical for Iraq and Syria. The eastern parts of Syria receive their water solely from the Euphrates; Iraq is similarly dependent on the water supply of the Tigris and the Euphrates in the entirety of its central and southern areas. Turkey, however, has built a large network of dams on the Tigris (Dicle) and Euphrates (Fırat) which originate in the East Anatolian highland. This policy has been described by its southern neighbors as "water imperialism."[14] Yet another point of conflict is the Syrian claim to the Hatay region lost to Turkey in 1939.

Turkey has no natural friends in its immediate neighborhood. Azerbaijan and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are connected to Turkey by the certainty of a common cultural and linguistic history. The languages spoken in these countries, including Turkish, belong to the Turkic language family.[15] Many more languages, predominantly found in Russia and China, belong to this group and are related but often hardly mutually intelligible.[16] Except for Azerbaijan in the Caucasus, the Central Asian Turkic states are thousands of miles distant from Turkey and directly accessible by neither land nor water. In the 1990s, Turkish foreign policy initially indulged in the expectation that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey could become a leading state for the Turkic countries of Central Asia. The hope was deceptive, however, because the Central Asian countries did not want to and could not completely free themselves from Russia, given the severe remaking of the region in the Soviet era and the status of Russian as a regional lingua franca. In the meantime, China has ascended alongside Russia as the second decisive actor in Central Asia, thanks to its proximity, its powerful economy, and above all its intention to establish a "new Silk Road," recently more prosaically dubbed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).[17]

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14 Çarkoğlu and Eder, "Water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin": 57.

15 The term "Turkic" refers to all languages of the Turkish language family, whereas "Turkish" is the term reserved for the official language spoken in Turkey.

16 On the variety of the Turkic languages, see Johanson and Csató, *Turkic Languages*; and for the history of the origins of the Turkic peoples, see the compelling depiction in Golden, *Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples*.

17 Hillman, *The Emperor's New Road*, offers an introduction.

Who lives in Turkey?

Describing Turkey in its spatial dimensions comes easily. A straightforward portrayal of who lives in Turkey is, by contrast, more difficult. Ethnic groups are not physical givens, rather their description depends on the standpoint of the observer. For example, a group can be interpreted from an outside (etic) perspective or be seen from the inside (emic). Ethnic and religious groups are furthermore complex structures which resist explicit description and classification. Writing about the ethnic diversity of Turkey can easily elicit a reproach for not acknowledging the territorial integrity of the Republic of Turkey or even for wishing to undermine it by consciously placing heterogeneity in the foreground.[18] From the standpoint of an outside observer, however, the ethnic diversity of Turkey is an expression of its historic and cultural richness.[19]

The ethnic diversity of today's Turkey, which rests on the foundation of a very clear Turkish Muslim majority population, is explicable by its Ottoman, indeed even pre-Ottoman, antecedents. The advance of Central Asian Turkic tribal nomads into the central lands of the Muslim world represents a fundamental turning point in Islamic history. On the back of their military strength, these nomads were able to conquer the lands of today's Iran and found the Great Seljuk dynasty there in the eleventh century. The migratory movement of the Turks from Central to West Asia has been compared to a bus ride: during the long trip from East to West, many passengers got off or transferred (e.g., towards Afghanistan or the Indus Valley), but most wanted to keep riding.[20] They arrived in Iran, where around a quarter of the population (primarily in the northwest) is Azeri-speaking. In any case, the following applied: the bus drivers were always changing, the motor had to be replaced repeatedly, and even the chassis was no longer the same.

We know the exact arrival time of this long journey: when Byzantium under Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes attempted to apply a brake to the gradual invasion of his eastern territory by Turkish nomads, a Great Seljuk army, supported by numerous Turkish tribal nomadic confederations, smashed the Byzantine army on 26 August 1071 at Manzikert (today Malazgirt,

18 For the exemplar of such careful affirmation, see Andrews, "Introduction," 41.

19 In comparison to Turkey, other countries in the region are incidentally considerably more ethnically diverse or not characterized by a demographically dominant ethnic group. Shi'ite Persian speakers, Iran's main group, comprise only around 60% of the population. Azeri Turks and Kurds are the largest groups in the remaining 40%, comprising 16 and 10%, respectively. See Axworthy, *Iran*, 126.

20 This vivid metaphor is found in Findley, *The Turks in World History*, 5.

north of Lake Van in East Anatolia). Anatolia was laid open to penetration by this new population. From then until the middle of the thirteenth century, approximately a million Turkish tribespeople streamed into Anatolia. These new arrivals in Anatolia belonged to a nomadic tradition that would shape Anatolia into the twentieth century.[21] Over the centuries, the original, formerly predominantly Orthodox populace of Anatolia converted in part to Islam. Also, following the establishment of the Ottoman Empire around 1300 in northwest Anatolia and its later extension across all of Anatolia, the Turkification and Islamization of the country continued—a process which came to a conclusion only in the early twentieth century.

The population of Turkey is cognizant of its diversity, as expressed in the proverb, "There are seventy-two-and-a-half nations in Turkey" (Türkiye'de yetmiş iki buçuk millet var).[22] The situation in today's Turkey pales in comparison, however, to the exceptional ethnic, confessional, and linguistic diversity of the Ottoman era. The Ottoman Empire was—except in the last few decades of its existence—not interested in shaping the population for the purposes of a national culture. The imperial leadership neither wanted nor needed to get involved in the internal organization of many regions and ruling confederations. The Ottoman Empire left Turkey not just the inheritance of its imperial expansion, but also that of its later process of contraction. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, millions of Turkish-speaking and/or Muslim refugees from former territories of Ottoman rule streamed into Anatolia; a large portion of them came from Southeastern Europe, which was called Rumelia (Rumeli, "the country of the 'Romans,'" i.e., the Byzantines) by the Ottomans. People in Turkey whose forebears originated in Southeastern Europe still speak today of their origin "from Rumelia" (Rumeli'den). Before and after the First World War, around three million Turks and Muslims had to leave Southeastern Europe for what is today Turkey. The descendants of these displaced persons, who constitute an estimated quarter of the total population of today's Turkey,[23] are a self-evident component of the Turkish Sunni majority.

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21 On (once) nomadic populations in Turkey, see, e.g., the entries in Andrews, *Ethnic Groups*, 58–62 (Yörük), 63–68 (Türkmen), 68–71 (Tahtacı), 71–73, and 435–438 (Abdal), 472–475 (Karaçadırlı) and 524–537 (Alevisme nomade).

22 Andrews, "Introduction," 18, see also 31, 40, 56. This Turkish proverb is possibly connected to an alleged saying of Prophet Muhammad, transmitted in a ḥadīth, that the Islamic community will split in seventy-three Muslim sects with only one entering paradise and seventy-two hell.

23 Kentel, "Identité nationale turque," 368. According to Karpat, "Introduction," xvi, between 1856 and 1995 around nine million migrants from Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus,

In addition, there are the descendants of Muslims who fled from or were driven by the Russian expansion in the Caucasus and the northern Black Sea region beginning in the eighteenth century. They include Nogay Tatars (from the steppes north of the Black Sea) and Crimean Tatars who, for the most part, had found a new home in the Ottoman territories of Southeastern Europe when they subsequently had to flee again, this time to Anatolia, along with the Muslims who had always lived in Rumelia. The Circassians deported by Russia from the Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire in 1864 were first settled between Christian and Muslim localities in Rumelia as *Wehrbauern* (defensive peasants). When they were no longer allowed to remain in the European portion of the Ottoman Empire after the conclusion of the Treaty of Berlin (1878), the Ottoman state settled them in, among other places, areas of today's Syria and Jordan.[24] The term "Circassian" covers, in both official and everyday usage in Turkey, almost all ethnic groups who immigrated to Turkey from the North Caucasus beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century—for example, Dagestanis, Ossetes, and Chechens. This genuinely misleading umbrella term goes back to, among other things, the attempt of Circassian associations from the 1950s on to build a union of all Caucasians living in Turkey under the "Circassian" umbrella. The Circassians (here denoting all these North Caucasians) understand themselves to be part of the Sunni Muslim community.[25] All these groups who fled into Turkey on the basis of their Muslim confessional identities were called *Muhacir* (literally, "emigrant") in the late Ottoman era, a term with religious overtones, as it derives from the same Arabic root as the word Hijra, the emigration of the Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in the year 622 which stands as the beginning date of the Islamic calendar.

A further source of today's ethnic diversity lies in the existence of formerly non-Turkish and non-Muslim ethnicities within today's Turkey which have, over time, become Muslim but which have maintained their ethnic and, in part, their linguistic identities. Among these are the Laz, who live in the eastern Black Sea region (that is, west of Batumi, Georgia). The actual Laz people, who speak a language of the Kartvelian family (like Georgian and Mingrelian),[26] are to be distinguished from the popular styling of all inhabitants of the eastern Black Sea coast as Laz. The cliches about "those"

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and the Crimea moved into the territory of today's Turkey; their share of the population of today's Turkey is around 40–50%.

24 For the contribution of the Circassians to the economic rise of today's Jordanian capital Amman, see Hamed-Troyansky, "Circassian Refugees."

25 Özbek, "Tscherkessen in der Türkei," 581, 587. On Circassians in the early Republican period, see Yelbaşı, *Circassians of Turkey*.

26 On the Laz, see Benninghaus, "Laz."

Laz widespread in Turkey are comparable to jokes about the East Frisians in Germany—that is, about a breed of people with a strange language and questionable intelligence.

Because state and linguistic borders do not coincide in southeast Anatolia, there is an Arabic-speaking population on Turkish state territory, whose share of the total population is, however, slight.[27] Areas of Arab settlement are in Hatay (the region around Antakya and İskenderun), in Çukurova (the lowlands lying between the Taurus Mountains and the Gulf of İskenderun, including the big cities of Adana and Mersin), and further east in regions bordering Syria and Iraq. The influx of around four million refugees from Syria in the 2010s has naturally altered the perception that Turkey's Arabic-speaking community is gradually dying out (due to its increasing adoption of Turkish).

This historically varied Muslim and today, as a rule, Turkish-speaking population, whose roots often trace back to flight and expulsion in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, now constitutes the clear majority of more than two-thirds of the population in Turkey. Their feeling of belonging rests on two pillars, that is, being both Turkish and Sunni Muslim.[28]

Jews in Turkey are a special bequest of the Ottoman era. The Ottomans not only left Jewish communities in the areas and cities they conquered, but they also welcomed a great number of Jews expelled from the Iberian Peninsula in the late fifteenth century.[29] These new Sephardic (that is, Spanish) Jews made Saloniki into a prominent center of Judaism which was completely annihilated by the German National Socialists in the Holocaust. Since the foundation of the Republic, however, and above all since the establishment of the State of Israel, a constant emigration has taken place. The number of Jews in Turkey has dropped to significantly fewer than twenty thousand. An increasingly open public and state antisemitism and the significant worsening of Turco-Israeli relations since the 2000s have led Turkish Jews to doubt their future in Turkey.

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27 Procházka, *Die arabischen Dialekte*, 12, estimates the number of Arabic speakers in the major region of Çukurova at seventy thousand people.

28 Per Andrews, *Ethnic Groups*, 73ff., Shi'ites were originally found above all around the East Anatolian cities Kars and Iğdır. According to the US Department of State, *International Religious Freedom Report*, 2, the Shi'ite community of Turkey estimates its share of the population today at 4%, which would be more than three million people—likely a considerable overestimate.

29 Brink-Danan, *Jewish Life in 21st-Century*, sees, also in the case of the five hundredth anniversary celebrations of the acceptance of the Sephardic Jews in the Ottoman Empire, a fundamental contradiction of Jewish existence in contemporary Turkey—between a necessary absolute assimilation into the Turkish majority environment in everyday life and, simultaneously, a politically (occasionally) desirable display of Jewish alterity as an alleged proof of an unbroken continuity of Ottoman-Turkish "tolerance."

Many have consequently taken up the offer of dual citizenship which Spain and Portugal have made to the descendants of Sephardic Jews (without the compulsory military service found in, e.g., Israel).[30]

In the Ottoman Empire, the most important pillars of ethnic and confessional variety—other than the Muslims—were Christian communities. The history of Christians in the territory of today's Turkey reaches back far beyond the Ottoman era. Still, Christian communities, above all the Greek Orthodox flock, can be regarded as a legacy of the Ottoman imperium. Until the beginning of the twentieth century, they were not only tolerated but institutionally recognized as confessional communities, despite the frequent conversions of individuals or entire groups to Islam. Before the First World War, indigenous Christians comprised around a fifth of the population of Anatolia, which has receded to less than 0.1% of the total population of Turkey today. Today the members of the indigenous churches of Anatolia numerically lag behind those Christians who have recently taken up residence in Turkey, for example, Christian spouses of Turkish citizens, economic migrants of Christian confession, or German retirees in Antalya.[31]

The Greeks of Orthodox faith had four core centers of settlement on the territory of modern Turkey during the late Ottoman period: along with the capital İstanbul, there was a large area of settlement on the Aegean coast which was actually strengthened by immigration from Greece in the nineteenth century. A third locus was that of the Karamanlı in Central Anatolia, who distinguished themselves by the use of Turkish in Greek script. The fourth core settlement center lay in the eastern coastal region of the Black Sea and had its origin in the Empire of Trebizond (Trabzon) which fell to the Ottomans in 1461, a few years after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople in 1453.

Under the terms of the population exchange between Greece and Turkey after World War One, all people of the Orthodox faith had to leave Turkey. Only the Greek Orthodox community in İstanbul and on two islands at the southern entrance to the Dardanelles were exempted from the requirement. While far more than two hundred thousand Orthodox Greeks might have been living

30 Côrte-Real Pinto and David, "Choosing Second Citizenship." For the history of the Jewish community in Turkey, see the plethora of publications by Rıfat N. Bali—e.g., Bali, *Model Citizens*.

31 Stoll, "Religion und Laizismus": 41, gives the following figures for the late 1990s: Greek Orthodox, sixteen thousand; Armenians, forty-five thousand; Syriac-Orthodox, fifteen thousand; Chaldeans, two thousand; Catholics, 6,500; other Christian denominations, 9,850.