

# **CONTENTS**

Acknowledgments	8
Abbreviations	9
Hebrew Terms	10
Prologue. A Personal Account: Reflections on the Design of a Progressive Research Program	12
1. Introduction: Political Spaces and Mo(ve)ments of Resistance	37
2. 1931 — An Arab-Jewish Civil Society Struggle against the British Colonial Government	60
3. 1959 — Wadi Salib Riots: Culminating a Decade of Ethnic Discrimination	90
4. 1960-1965 — The Action Committees' Revolt: Full Employment Crisis, Failed Democratization and State Expansion	122
5. 1971 — The Black Panthers Movement: Ethnic Tensions and "Left-Right" Tribal Polarization	151
6. 1980 — Forum/13 Powerful Workers: Hyperinflation and the Challenge to State Autonomy	181
7. 1987-1993 — The Intifada: The Palestinian Resistance Mo(ve)ment	217
8. 2011 — The J14 Mo(ve)ment: The Emergence of the Occupy Repertoire of Resistance	251
9. Conclusion: On the Dynamics of Political Spaces—Time, Movement, Actors and Masses	275
List of Sources	314
Bibliography	315
Index	331

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# **Abbreviations**

IAI — Israel Aviation Industries

IBA — Israel Broadcasting Authority

IDF — Israeli Defense Forces

IEC — Israel Electric Corporation

LIC — Labor Institutional Complex

NUG — National Unity Government

PA — Palestinian Authority

PLO — Palestinian Liberation Organization

OT — Occupied Territories

WC — Washington Consensus

WS — Workers' Society

WZO — World Zionist Organization

ZLM — Zionist Labor Movement

# **Hebrew Terms**

- *Ahdut Haavoda* United Labor Zionist Socialist party founded in 1919.
- Agudat Yisrael Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazi Party.
- *Ayarot Pituach* Development towns.
- Balad National Palestinian Democratic Party established in 1999.
- Dash Democratic Party for Change, established towards 1977 elections.
- Gesher Temporary splits of David Levy from the *Likud* in 1995 and 1999.
- Hadash Democratic Front for Change. Established by the Communist Party and leaders of the Black Panthers in 1977.
- Haganah The military organization of the Yishuv, and forerunner of the Israeli Defense Forces.
- *Hapoel Hatzair* The Young Worker party, founded in 1905.
- Hashomer Hatzair Zionist Socialist and Marxist Party established in 1919.
- *Hevrat Haovdim* Workers Society, the name of the holding Company of enterprizes owned by the *Histadrut*.
- Histadrut Shortened version of Hahistadrut Haclalit shel haovdim haivrim beeretz Israel, or General Federation of Hebrew Workers in the Land of Israel.
- *Kadima* Namely "Forward" list formed before the 2006 elections by leaders splitting from *Likud* and Labor.
- *Likud* Main right wing party established towards 1973 elections.
- Ma'arach Alignment. A list of the Labor Party and Mapam formed leading up to the 1969 elections.
- Mafdal National Religious Party.
- Mapai Eretz Israel workers party; the ruling party of Zionism and the State of Israel from 1933 to 1977. It was founded in 1930 as a union of Hapoel Hatzair and Achdut Haavoda.
- Mapam United workers party, established in 1948 by Ahdut Haavoda and Hashomer Hatzair.
- Meretz Zionist left party established towards 1992 elections by Ratz, Shinui and Mapam.
- *Moked* Socialist list in the 1973 elections.
- ${\it Moledet}$  Extreme right wing list supporting transfer of Palestinians

- led by Gen. (res.) Rehavaam Zeevi in the 1992 elections.
- *Morasha* Extremist religious national party temporal split from RNP in the 1984 elections.
- Ometz Small center party list formed by former Treasury Minister Horowitz for the 1984 elections.
- *Palmach* Elite underground militia established by the *Haganah*.
- *Poalei Tzion* The Workers of Zion party founded in 1905.
- Poalei Tzion Smol Marxist split from Poalei Tzion in 1919.
- *Ra'am* Religious Muslim Party established in 1999.
- Rafi Electoral list established by Ben Gurion in 1965, joined Mapai in 1968 forming the Labor Party.
- Ratz Civil Rights Movement party established by Shulamit Aloni in 1977.
- Shas Religious Ultra-Orthodox party established in 1984.
- Sheli Left wing list towards 1977 elections, including Moked, Haolam Haze, and splinters from the Black Panthers and Labor Party.
- Shinui Liberal party that was part of *Dash* in 1977, *Meretz* in 1992-1999, and independent in1981, 1984, 1988 and 1999-2003 elections.
- Tami Traditional Mizrahi list in 1981 elections.
- *Tehia* Extreme right wing Split from Likud in 1981.
- *Tsomet* Right wing list led by Gen. (res.) Raphael Eitan in 1992 elections.
- Yaad Center list towards 1984 led by Gen. (res.) Ezer Weitzman.
- Yishuv Literally, settlement. Used in Palestine (as elsewhere) to refer to the entire Jewish community.
- *Yesh Atid* Center list organized towards 2013 elections.
- Yisrael Beiteinu Right wing party led by Avigdor Lieberman since 2006 elections.

# PROLOGUE A PERSONAL ACCOUNT: REFLECTIONS ON THE DESIGN OF A PROGRESSIVE RESEARCH PROGRAM

This book was born out of an accidental sequence of events, just like the history of Israeli politics I wish to describe and analyze here. I never intended "to tell the story" of Israeli politics from its inception, precisely because I reject the idea of paradigmatic meta-narratives. I am strongly convinced that history has no necessary logic or direction; it is rather the path-dependent outcome of crucial turning points. Politics matters. The question is how political actors act and react to historical junctures, opportunities and challenges given structural constraints, competition with other actors, and the interests of dominant institutions and power-holders to maintain their position despite the resistance of subordinated populations.

The comparative research project presented here is an attempt to analyze critical turning points in Israeli/Palestinian history given the tension between political power holders and the resistance movements of subordinated, marginalized, misrecognized and underrepresented social forces. It is not at all a systematic history: it lacks many turning points, particularly those related to wars and peace-making, and several important factors and actors are ignored. It is designed rather to fill in certain vacuums in the sociology of Israel/Palestine, mainly by "bringing politics back in." It is designed as a progressive scientific plan seeking to contribute to the conceptualization of political dynamics, democracy and social movements.

## I. Israeli Sociology in Historical and Political Context

Most leading political sociologists attempted to write paradigmatic metanarratives of Israel, doomed to fail due to their teleological approach (Swirski, 1979). The first and best-known sociologist who eventually became the model for future generations of sociologists was Talcott Parsons'

best disciple, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. In 1967, Eisenstadt published the first sociological paradigmatic meta-narrative, translating Labor Zionist ideology to structural-functionalist sociology. He suggested a triumphal theory of Labor Zionism, interpreted as better suited to build nation-state institutions and power, analyzing Zionism as a revolutionary movement modernizing the Jewish people (Eisenstadt, 1967). Unfortunately for this paradigmatic project, and for the history of Israel, 1967 was a crucial turning point year, the moment when Labor Zionism ideology and power interest defeated itself, expanding the borders of the Jewish State and inserting the Palestinians in Israeli economy under a military-imposed structure of domination. The military expansion of Israel is analyzed in Chapter 4 as an accidental historical turning point that eventually provided an effective response to the challenge of working-class resistance to Labor Zionism's non-representative institutions in 1960-1966.

Eisenstadt's first disciples, Horowitz and Lissak (1978), and his most salient critic, Yonatan Shapiro (1977), did not have better luck in terms of timing with the publication of their meta-narrative paradigms. All of them developed revised paradigms explaining Labor Zionism's flexibility and capacity to adapt itself to changing conditions in the aftermath of 1967. Horowitz and Lissak attempted to correct the Parsonian functionalist model<sup>1</sup> using Shil's (1957) model of center and periphery. They argued that Labor Zionism was able to build functional adaptive institutions and construct the political center of Jewish society despite the external conditions of a dual society of Jews and Arabs under the pre-1948 British Mandate (Horowitz and Lissak, 1978). The direct and explicit goal of this teleological paradigm was to explain why Labor Zionism was so well prepared to continue ruling Israel after the historical turning point of 1948, and the dramatic change of its social composition with the big migration movements of Jews in and Arabs out. The indirect and implicit meaning of this paradigm was to justify and explain why Labor Zionist institutions were also able to adapt themselves to a dual society imposed on the Palestinians after 1967. Chapter 2 discusses the Labor Movement's pre-1948 institutions as a political reaction to the resistance of Jewish-Arab civil society.

Yonatan Shapiro criticized functionalist interpretations of Zionist

<sup>1</sup> For an exhaustive and comprehensive analysis of Israeli sociological paradigms and schools see The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology (Ram, 1995).

Labor using elitist theories of power (Michels, 1915; Mills, 1959). He argued that Labor institutions were not designed to build an egalitarian or socialist society, as their ideology claimed, but on the contrary, ideology was used manipulatively to legitimize and conceal the extent of their power. The structure and goal of political institutions was to empower the dominant elites and to maintain them, effectively subordinating Jewish civil society—not only workers, but also the middle classes and big capital. According to Shapiro, Israeli democracy was only formal, and it did not function as a process of representing civil society forces and alternative policies; the ruling party controlled all centers of power, effectively preventing the opposition from challenging and replacing it (Shapiro, 1977).

Shapiro's theory of a non-democratic Labor superpower and Horowitz and Lissak's theory of Labor institutions' adaptive advantage to function in a dual society were published the same year the Labor Party lost the elections and its hegemonic position after dominating Zionism and the State of Israel since 1933. Chapter 5 discusses the *Likud*'s ascent to power as the effective manipulation of the of the *Mizrahi Jews*' resistance movement<sup>2</sup> against Labor institutions imposed on them. Since then, the political imagination of left and right identities remained closely attached to ethno-class hostility between the *Ashkenazi* middle-class and the peripheral *Mizrahi Jews*.

Apparently, the experience of these four founding fathers of Israeli sociology demonstrates that attempts to build meta-narratives with a paradigmatic teleology are doomed to fail due to the unpredictability of historical turning points. Sewell's (1996) suggestion of eventful temporality and path dependent history, where sequences of events and unpredicted turning points are crucial, seemed much more satisfactory to me. However, Shapiro's critique of democracy has provided the initial insight for my own research project on politics and turning points. I started with the critique of the Zionist Labor institutional design built to control civil society, markets and politics, aiming to explain the failure of democratization within the borders of the sovereign State of Israel, and its further colonial expansion to maintain its power.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Mizrahi is the more or less consensual Hebrew adjective for Jews who migrated from Arab countries, in English usually referred as Oriental Jews. I'll use the Hebrew term here.

<sup>3</sup> The late Yonatan Shapiro was my teacher and friend, and supervised my PhD thesis The Crisis of Full Employment (Grinberg, 1991b).

\*

I owe most of my knowledge and research interests to the vibrant intellectual community of the new generation of sociology researchers in Israel. All research questions and projects presented in this book are part and parcel of a collective intellectual effort to review Israeli sociology after 1977. The founding fathers' failure to build a meta-narrative paradigm gave birth to an impressive flourishing of critical theories devoid of any pretension to formulate a single paradigmatic meta-narrative.

The resistance of *Mizrahi* Jews to Labor rule was first studied by Bernstein (1976) and Swirski (1981), who suggested applying the model of internal colonialism to explain the powerful position of European Jews, represented by Labor Zionism, which was built on the exploitation and marginalization of Jewish immigrants from Arab countries (Swirski and Bernstein, 1980). The marginal position of *Mizrahi* Jews was later analyzed by *Mizrahi* intellectuals and scholars beyond the material and economic conflict of interests using Said's (1979) critique of Orientalism and other postcolonial theories. Their goal was to explain the relationship between the subordination of Jews from Arab countries and the conflict of the Zionist European settlers with the Palestinian Arabs (Shohat, 1988; Chetrit, 2010, Shenhav, 2006). I will return to this still open puzzle in the concluding chapter of this book.

Zureik (1979) and Lustick (1980) applied the internal colonialism model to analyze the subordinated and marginal position of the Palestinians who remained in the Jewish State after 1948 and were subjected to martial law despite their official status as citizens with political rights. In the same years, Eisenstadt's most brilliant and prolific disciple, Baruch Kimmerling, caused a path-breaking paradigmatic shift in Israeli sociology when he suggested that the borders of the society to be analyzed are not those of Jewish society, but those of Jewish/Arab and Israeli/Palestinian societies framed by the state's borders (Kimmerling, 1989, 1992). In doing so, Kimmerling created a historical continuity between the pre-1948 colonial state and the post-1967 colonialist expansion of Israel's borders. Within this new paradigm Gershon Shafir (1987) and Kimmerling (1983) suggested that Israel should be analyzed as a settler society where the key questions involve institutions built to expand land appropriation, maintain and legitimize control, and the various

institutions that organize and control indigenous or migrant labor.

The dominant role of Labor institutions in the construction of Israeli political power and its economic implications were analyzed by Grinberg (1991) and Shalev (1992) using neo-corporatist and dual labor market theories. In order to explain the dominant position of the military in Israeli society, several theories of militarism were adapted to the peculiar Israeli case (Kimmerling, 1993; Ben Eliezer, 1995; Levy, 2003; Helman, 1999; Grinberg, 2008).

After focusing on specific aspects of power building, domination, and conflict from 1977 to 1993, a new historical challenge appeared upon Labor's return to power: the recognition of the Palestinians and the opposition it provoked. Rabin's assassination in 1995 gave birth to three new attempts to offer meta-narratives of Israeli/Palestinian society, now suggested by critical sociologist. In my opinion, however, these improved critical attempts were not more successful than those formulated by the founding fathers. The new critical macro-paradigms of Israel were offered by Kimmerling's *The Invention and Decline of Israeliness* (2001), Shafir and Peled's *Being Israeli* (2002) and Uri Ram's *Globalization of Israel* (2008). These meta-narrative paradigms assume, like Eisenstadt, that one theory can explain all events from the inception of Zionism, now explaining why the old national solidarity declined and split into various competing factions.

The new critical paradigms suggested teleological explanations of the crisis of national identity neglecting the disastrous political performance of the Labor party and "the Left" during the 1990s. They attribute the decline of "Zionism" (Ram), "Israeliness" (Kimmerling) or "republicanism" (Shafir and Peled) to the neo-liberal economic shift after the Likud's rise to power in 1977, and the ensuing expansion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank. These paradigms keep politics out of the picture, absolving Labor of responsibility for its own failure and that of the peace process during the 1990s. Instead, responsibility is shifted to the right, or "ethno-nationalism" (Shafir and Peled, 2002), "neo-Zionism" (Ram, 2008) and the national-religious settlement drive (Kimmerling, 2001). The European cultural and economic elites who lost power in 1977 somehow became the "good guys": after the Likud's rise to power, they were "liberal" (Shafir and Peled), "secular" (Kimmerling), or "post-Zionist" (Ram). These critical paradigms were not pro-Labor like those of the founding fathers; rather, they involuntarily became what I have called "Labor-yearning" sociologies, despite their critique of Labor institutions and policies before 1977 (Grinberg, 2004). In addition, these latest paradigmatic efforts had bad publication timing—no less than those of the "founding fathers": they were published after the revival of Zionism, republicanism, and Israeli nationalism following the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000.

In *Politics and Violence in Israel/Palestine* (Grinberg, 2010) I analyze the political dynamics of the years 1992-2006, emphasizing crucial turning points and the political dynamics absent in the new critical paradigmatic perspectives. As mentioned above, it is my opinion that every attempt to explain Israeli/Palestinian history with one comprehensive theory became teleological and was doomed to fail (Grinberg, 2009). Moreover, due to the predictable delay between our initial questions, research, writing and publishing, it is not surprising that all big paradigms of Israel were published after historical developments made them outdated.

### II. DESIGNING A COMPARATIVE RESEARCH PLAN

I am a product of the critical sociological effort in Israel, but still somehow an outsider. This is probably due to my background as a Latin American migrant, kicked out of my continent in the 1970s by the clash between repressive military regimes supported by the US and armed revolutionary groups. Since I migrated to Israel in 1972, I had always alternative realities in mind: as a sociologist I never accepted the obvious as an explanation, and as social and political activist I rejected the conservative attitude of "real-politik." In my different research projects I applied the most critical approaches, usually focusing on specific historical "surprises," or questions existing theories were unable to explain. I sought to understand the strange society and polity I had landed in. Here was a regime that claimed to be democratic and socialist but actually imposed military rule over the Palestinian population, perpetuated extreme discrimination among Jews, and proved unable to represent and contain conflicts between them.

My historical puzzles go back and forth, and constitute the basis of this book. I attempt to explain why Jews and Arabs revolted against British colonial rule in 1931 and no one wrote about it (Grinberg, 2003; Chapter 2 below); why Labor Zionism expanded the country's borders in 1967, contradicting its ideology and proclaimed goal of creating a separated and democratic Jewish nation-state (Grinberg, 1993; Chapter 4 below); why an apparent working-class revolt against Labor Zionist anti-democratic trade unions in 1980 ended in1985 with the aggressively anti-labor neo-liberal economic policies in 1985, implemented by the Labor-*Likud* national coalition (Grinberg, 1991; Chapter 6 here); and why the anti-colonial Palestinian revolt in 1988 ended with the re-accommodation of the Israeli military rule, improving Israel's capacity to control and subordinate Palestinians, in cooperation with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) leadership (Grinberg, 2010, Chapter 7 here).

I never pretended to write one comprehensive history of the unexpected and unpredictable development of the Israeli/Palestinian polity, and despite the fact this book may appear to be a comprehensive history or might be misinterpreted as such, it would be a serious error. This book does not suggest any new comprehensive paradigm, but rather represents a non-paradigmatic—or even anti-paradigmatic—approach. I do not believe Zionism necessarily had to deteriorate to such low ebb as it has since 2000, and I reject teleology in social sciences, which assumes that history has any direction or logic. In my previous research projects, I analyzed singular historical turning points, and here I present all of them together. I compare the cases, and analyze the relations between them as unpredictable sequences of events, using path-dependent eventful sociology (Sewell, 1996, 2005).

The sequence of events that led me to write this book includes the call for manuscripts by the Academic Studies Press immediately after I published *Politics and Violence* (Grinberg, 2010), and a delay in writing until late 2011 due to health problems. The delay was fortunate, because it enabled me to study Michael Burawoy's approach to designing comparative research. I met him during my stay at Berkeley, where I sought some distance from my tempestuous country in order to write this book. Thanks to very generous and open conversations with Burawoy, I came to deeply understand both his methodological approach and his interpretation of critical sociology. As you may recall, this was a time of social upheaval and radical enthusiasm, of the "Occupy movements" that I had the opportunity to observe both in Oakland and in Israel, providing important theoretical insights to my comparative research of re-

sistance movements and dynamic political spaces. The final corrections made in February 2013 enabled me to finalize the theoretical argument and to add a final chapter on the occupy resistance movement against neo-liberal policies in 2011.

The last case contributed significantly to the conceptualization of resistance movements, adding a fourth category to my previous distinction between types of resistance with different social bases, countermovements and repertoires of collective action: anticolonial civil society revolts against externally imposed state institutions (Chapters 2 and 7); ethnic riots against their discrimination by the dominant cultural elites (Chapters 3 and 5), working class strike waves against employers and state economic policies (Chapters 4 and 6); and mass occupations of public space in protest against neo-liberal economic policies and the unchecked and unbalanced decision making processes imposed by international financial power (Chapter 8).

The key question that vexed me from the very start of the project was methodological: how should I compare historical cases and to what end? Burawoy argued during our talks that the goal of comparison is to discover how peoples' struggle can succeed, rather than explain why they have failed. Comparative sociological research is designed to reveal variations that contribute to a progressive scientific plan for social change. As researchers, we are not outside of history but part of it, and our investigations are part and parcel of social processes, whether we contribute to a progressive or reactionary project.

Burawoy's comparison of Theda Skocpol's and Leon Trotsky's theories of the Russian Revolution (Burawoy, 1989) is a fine example of good and bad designs of comparative research programs. The surprising argument of his article is that Trotsky understood the Russian Revolution better than Skocpol. A leader deeply involved in politics and the organization of the revolution had a better understanding of historical events before they occurred than a well-trained social scientist with historical perspective and much more information. Why? Because of a poorly designed comparative research program. Skocpol compares three revolutions (the English, French and Russian) as if they occurred out of time, namely, ignoring the influence of one revolution on the other. The sequence of events is crucial to the understanding of history (Sewell, 1996).

Following Lakatos (1978), Burawoy suggests that a progressive re-

search method must take (any) hard-core theory and build an "expanding belt of theories that increase the corroborated empirical content and solve successive puzzles" (Burawoy, 1989: 761). This is exactly what Trotsky did: he had a theory of revolution in hand, Marxism, and was committed to it. This commitment led him to understand that Marx had been wrong, and that the revolution would start in Russia, rather than in the most developed capitalist economies of Germany or England, but the revolution could not lead immediately to socialism due to the need to industrialize Russia (Trotsky, 1906). As early as 1906, Trotsky was aware of the dangers of a revolution before the capitalist economy would develop, but in 1917, when he was already one of the leaders, he ignored his own warnings (Burawoy, 1989: 792).

My conversations with Burawoy led me to reflect on the relation between my own position in society and history—namely my political activism—and my research interests, questions and theories. I had always been designing progressive research programs that start with a historic puzzle, something that did not fit into existing theories and explanations. I adopted what seemed to me the most appropriate theoretical tool for exploring the field and in each research project I was surprised to find some resistance movement that helped solve the puzzle and expand the theory. It was the movement of resistance to the dominant power and the related, unpredictable historical turning points that helped shed light on historical shifts and manipulative political actions designed to maintain power. In this research project I compare cases aiming to expand the theoretical framework of dynamic political spaces by learning how movements of resistance challenge those in power, and how they react to the challenge.

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Political space is an analytical tool designed to interpret the political dynamics of representation of social forces in the political sphere, as well as the peaceful containment of social and economic conflicts by political mediation, negotiation and compromise. Political space is opened to mediate between sides to a conflict—between the state and civil society, and between dominant and dominated social forces—in moments when unilateral repression by the most powerful is ineffective or not viable due to some balance of power between the parties. The concept

of political space is a critical tool for analyzing democratic regimes and transitions to democracy (Grinberg, 2010). The symbolic space of representation of subordinated social forces is *dynamic*: it can be opened by recognizing their claims, identities, agendas, and representatives, but can also be closed or shrunk by the physical or symbolic violence of the dominant elites.

This theoretical conceptualization is the result of thirty years of progressive research programs designed to unlock the puzzle of Israeli politics: its incredible success in closing political space to all subordinated populations while maintaining a democratic image rarely questioned by its citizens, or the international community, for that matter. The issue that has been at the focus of all my research programs so far has been the limitations of democracy, or more precisely, the inaccessibility of democratic representation for subordinated social forces, despite the existence of democratic rules of the game. In the next two sections I will present the sequence of my research programs, motivations, questions, puzzles, initial theories, and conclusions that have progressively contributed to formulating the political space concept.

# III. My Initial Research Project: The Working Class and Political Economy

a. The Historical Slip of the Tongue. In the early 1980s I was a young Argentinian immigrant in Israel, indirectly<sup>4</sup> influenced by the trend of socialist theories and movements that spread in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. Given the extremely different reality in Israel, I decided I should investigate this very strange country where capitalists were called "socialists" or "leftist," while large sections of the working class were avowed nationalists and supported the "right." My political activism and research interests converged: during the 1970s I became interested in working-class struggles, and became a "representative" in the Histadrut Executive Committee, despite the fact that I was not a worker but a student<sup>5</sup> activist in Campus, a Jewish-Arab student organization.

<sup>4</sup> I was not a member of Zionist-socialist youth movements, neither of Argentinian leftist organizations, on the opposite, I was raised in a bourgeois Jewish country club. However, I was exposed to my generations' activism, interests, and preoccupations.

<sup>5</sup> I was nominated as a "worker representative" in the Histadrut by my party (Moked) when I was not

In my first research project for an MA seminar,<sup>6</sup> I referred to the Marxist theory of class conflict and searched for working class solidarity between Jews and Arabs before the establishment of the Jewish State. Initially I did not find a single instance of genuine solidarity.<sup>7</sup> However, while reading newspapers and protocols I came across an event that was completely ignored by the historians and sociologists of the pre-state period: a joint and successful public transportation strike against the arbitrary imposition of heavy taxes, which succeeded in mobilizing the support of the entire Jewish-Arab population against the British colonial government. This was not in fact the working class, but businessmen, private owners of trucks and buses, or companies, providing a service to the whole population.

In my attempt to analyze this extraordinary moment of anti-colonial Jewish-Arab resistance, I formulated a new interpretation of the dominant trend of history leading to ethno-national confrontation, violence, and forced migration. Although class interests matter, my analysis suggested new questions: How are class and national identities articulated? What is the social basis of the dominant political elite that builds the nation, and what is its strategy to accomplish its political goals? The analytical framework I proposed to comprehend this political dynamic involved a complex matrix of class interests and intra-communal struggles and relationships (Grinberg, 2003). I explained why both the Jewish and Arab urban economic elites failed to consolidate their national communities and proved unable to take the political lead. I showed how rural conflicts over land and labor shaped relations between the two communities as a "national" conflict over exclusive state power, led by the very well-organized Zionist Labor Movement (ZLM) and the more spontaneous revolutionary Palestinian peasants (see also Shapiro, 1976; Kimmerling, 1983; Ben Eliezer, 1998; Lockman, 1996; Sayigh, 1979).

I reached four main conclusions on the basis of this MA seminar.

at all a worker, and even not a member of the *Histadrut*. This strange situation made clear that it was very important to understand the idea of representation and the peculiar political institution that "represented" the workers in Israel.

<sup>6</sup> This was a seminar on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict taught by the late Professor Baruch Kimmerling. I collected the material and wrote the seminar in the early 1980s, but it was first published in Hebrew in 1995 and only in 2003 was it published in English (Grinberg, 2003).

<sup>7</sup> There were several cases (Lockman, 1996; Bernstein, 2000) however the most famous and long-living case was of the Railway Company workers, a small group of skilled workers that never organized a struggle widely supported by the Jewish and Arab civil society.

# Конец ознакомительного фрагмента. Приобрести книгу можно в интернет-магазине «Электронный универс» e-Univers.ru