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## **Preface**

## From a Pariah People to a Pariah State **Eunice G. Pollack**

Since the Holocaust, in much of the Western world, the expression or acknowledgment of antisemitic views came to be considered unacceptable. Over the last half century, however, even febrile anti-Zionist pronouncements increasingly elicit no censure—are routinely applauded—no matter how readily recognizable they are as updated versions of the world's oldest hatred. The overlap has become so substantial, so frequent, that Benjamin Ginsberg finds that although "it is ... possible to be anti-Zionist without being antisemitic ..., what is true in principle is often not so true in practice." United by their anti-Zionism, "'green/brown' alliances ... between progressives and neo-Nazis [now] find common ground on the Jewish question."

Similarly, Jerold Auerbach identifies anti-Zionism as "the currently fashionable expression of antisemitism." Anti-Zionism and antisemitism have often become so intertwined, he observes, that "gullible students claiming to be 'progressive' (while failing to understand their own antisemitism) have flocked to the cause [of Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions—BDS]." He concludes that "a generation of students … brainwashed by their professors into believing the worst about Israel … have unknowingly endorsed the final solution to the Jewish problem embraced by every maniacal dictator from Titus to Hitler."

Not infrequently, however, the anti-Zionist veil is fully lifted, and the old familiar features of antisemitism cannot be gainsaid. Exposed by David Patterson, the glaring countenance is unmistakable in Nobel laureate José Saramago's 2002 depiction of Israel as "a racist state by virtue of Judaism's monstrous doctrines—racist not just against the Palestinians, but against the entire world, which it seeks to manipulate and abuse." Similarly, the declamation of the anti-Zionist Salafist Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Yaqoub, broadcast in 2009, reveals his naked, artless antisemitism: "If the Jews left Palestine to us, would we start loving them? Of course not.... Our fighting with the Jews is eternal, and it will not end ..., until not a single Jew remains on the face of the Earth."

Thus the contributors to *From Antisemitism to Anti-Zionism*—utilizing the lenses of history, sociology, political science, psychology, philosophy, religion, and literature—examine, disentangle, and remove the disguises from the many forms of antisemitism and anti-Zionism inhabiting the English-speaking world, past and present.

One of the major themes of this study—a phenomenon the authors encountered again and again—is the widespread refusal to acknowledge even blatant antisemitism—the elephant in the middle of the room. Alternatively, antisemitism is evaded by recrafting it—defending it—as only a rational response to alleged execrable actions—no longer attributed to Jews, but to the Jewish state. The accusation of the modern antisemite is not the hoary deicide charge, but one more potent in an increasingly secular age—that of genocide committed by the Jewish state. Still, in an era in which the enlightened scrutinize themselves and all others for traces of racism, sexism, homophobia—and recently, Islamophobia—and condemn putative microaggressions against those identified as minority groups, the mandatory diversity curricula and training rarely devote any attention to antisemitism, anti-Zionism, or Jews.

Thus Part I exposes and analyzes the many facets of "antisemitism denial." In Chapter 1, David Hirsh finds among a number of prominent political, academic, and media figures in England not only "a recurrent pattern of refusal even to try" to recognize one's antisemitism, but also the ready disclaimer of bigotry that all "I am doing is criticizing Israel." Their response to any accusation of

antisemitism is the counteraccusation that the accuser's "real concern" can only be "to silence ... criticisms of Israeli human rights abuses." Hirsh is led to conclude that "hostility to Israel is becoming more and more a marker of belonging on the contemporary Left." The deflection and denial of any accusation of antisemitism have, however, "inoculated the progressive movement not against antisemitism itself, but against having to take the issue of antisemitism seriously."

In Chapter 2, Neil Kressel approaches the issue from another angle, but he too finds that antisemitism—if not denied—is simply ignored. After showing that there exists a "cauldron of antisemitic hatred in much of the Muslim world," which is "widespread, intense, and deeply ingrained, dangerous, and growing," he finds it "jolting" that the "mainstream anti-racist community in the United States"—or in the West—rarely acknowledges it—and even those who do, try "to attribute this bigotry to sources remote from Islam per se."

When Kressel turns to social scientists' study of antisemitism, once again, his findings are "startling," for "the social sciences, which once built major theoretical advances upon research into the origins of Jew-hatred, have all but abandoned the topic." His review of the massive PSYCHINFO index of peer-reviewed social scientific studies finds that only a minuscule percentage of the entries (1990–2009) that "examined racism, prejudice, or discrimination ... focused on antisemitism," and "most of those items ... dealt with the Holocaust." Similarly, his survey of "standard textbooks" and syllabi of courses on "prejudice, racism, or diversity" reveals only minimal attention to antisemitism, and the complete neglect of Muslims' "anti-Jewish bigotry." Indeed, "anti-Islamic bigotry and anti-Arab bigotry are covered more heavily."

Part II focuses on the historical dimensions of antisemitism in the United States, shining new light on the bigotry of both elites and the masses. Here it is not only the efforts to ignore antisemitism that are exposed, but the determination to erase it from the historical record. Rafael Medoff, in Chapter 3, systematically examines the frequent, profoundly antisemitic comments and analyses of presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S Truman, and Richard M. Nixon. There is President Nixon speaking of "Jew boys," a "kike," imagining a "Jewish cabal," and denouncing his attorney—"Goddamn his Jewish soul!" There is Truman writing (in 1945!): "The Jews claim God Almighty picked 'em out for special privilege. Well I'm sure he had better judgment." And FDR, boasting to a senator that "there is no Jewish blood in our veins," and rationalizing "German antisemitism as an 'understandable' response to Jewish behavior." Medoff points out, however, that despite holding antisemitic views, Truman extended "de facto recognition [to] the newborn State of Israel" and Nixon provided "the massive American airlift of arms to Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War." By contrast, FDR's antisemitism shaped his deleterious policies toward Jewish refugees during the years of the Third Reich, infecting "his otherwise inexplicable policy of suppressing Jewish immigration far below the legal limits" of the time.

Here too the antisemitism is literally blotted out. Medoff recounts that, for the most part, the public did not learn of the presidents' bigotry until long after they had left office. The extent and depth of Nixon's antisemitism became evident only upon the release of Oval Office tapes in the 1990s and from 2009 to 2013, though he died in 1994. Medoff observes that Truman "long enjoyed near-heroic status in the Jewish community," because his highly antisemitic characterizations of Jews remained largely unknown until 1983 and 2003, though he left office in 1953 and died in 1972. The public was "shocked" by the revelations, because noted historians had watered down—and had even chosen "to withhold evidence" of—Truman's "private expressions about Jews." Indeed, Medoff explains that the classic studies of America's response to the Holocaust, published in the 1960s and 70s, attributed FDR's actions "entirely ... [to] political and military considerations," because the evidence of his "private attitudes toward Jews" remained buried. Here too eminent scholars chose to omit any mention of Roosevelt's disturbing antisemitic exchanges and refrained from publishing documentation of his antisemitic statements. Notably, Medoff contends that even in a 2013

work, historians went to considerable lengths in their efforts to trivialize and deny FDR's antisemitism.

Stephen Norwood directs his attention in Chapter 4 to the antisemitism not of the presidents, but of the masses—and he too finds a cover-up of antisemitism, though not by historians. Norwood focuses on the virulent antisemitic propaganda disseminated by the Christian Front—whose membership consisted largely of Irish-Americans inspired by the anti-Jewish vitriol of the radio-priest Charles Coughlin—and on their physical assaults on Jews from the 1930s through the mid-1950s. He finds that not only did the police refuse to protect those under attack, but that the authorities obscured the antisemitic nature of the Jew-hunting expeditions, the repeated beatings of Jews, and the "destruction of Jewish property." In Boston, for example, even the "mainstream press refrained from reporting the bloody physical assaults ... in part because the Christian Front commanded widespread grassroots support." And when the journalist Arnold Beichman broke the story on the "Christian Front's 'organized campaign of terrorism'" in the newspaper PM, the Massachusetts governor "angrily denounced [his] 'stinking' article."

The Christian Front and the "Coughlinite press" also "trivialized" the antisemitic attacks—just as they minimized Nazis' persecution of Jews. The head of Boston's Christian Front declared in 1940 that "all the stories about murders and attacks" on Germany's Jews were "lies and mere propaganda." Moreover, the Coughlinite press claimed that "the Catholic persecution [in Germany] far outruns the Jewish." To be sure, this was allegedly hidden from the public because of "Jewish control of the American media." Such contentions are echoed today in anti-Zionists' strenuous efforts to minimize the existence of antisemitism and insistence that, in any event, it is far surpassed by Islamophobia. And once more, the truth allegedly remains concealed, because Jews continue to control the media.

Indeed, many of the antisemitic tropes, charges, and strategies that Norwood uncovers for the Christian Front and its allies in the earlier period resurface in the anti-Zionist movement that gathered strength after the founding of the Jewish state. Where the Christian Front once plastered "genocidal" threats in the New York subways, anti-Zionists promise to drive the Jews into the sea and their posters on campus wipe Israel off the map of the Middle East. As targets of antisemitic assaults, Jews in the earlier period felt unsafe on many American city streets, and young boys were "afraid to wear skull-caps" outdoors. In recent years, Jews fear attacks by anti-Zionists in many European cities, where they dare not wear yarmulkes, and on campuses in the United States, where armed guards must patrol "Jewish events." And just as the Christian Front and allied groups, "imitating the Nazis' example," conducted boycotts of Jewish-owned stores in the United States, "progressive" anti-Zionist academics and churches now call for boycotts of Israel, Israeli products, and even Israeli Jews.

Where Norwood shows that Coughlinite ideology "combined traditional Christian theological" convictions and racial antisemitic beliefs—linking Jewish bankers with the "Jewish leaders" who allegedly "ordered Jesus's crucifixion"—anti-Zionists often join Islamic theological and racial images of Jews—explicitly connecting contemporary Israelis to the Jews who fought Muhammad and tried to poison him. Many textbooks in American parochial schools were found to depict Jews "as cursed by God;" many anti-Zionist texts now instruct that Jews are cursed by Allah. Where Coughlinites taught that by cornering the market in gold, "the elder Rothschild," along with the Jews, planned to "control the world," many anti-Zionists contend that by settling Palestine, in a determined effort to conquer the market in "black gold," Baron L. W. Rothschild and the Jews were again attempting to fulfill their plans to dominate the world. Notably, both the antisemites of the earlier period and anti-Zionists of the modern era gleaned much of their evidence for the nefarious plots from the infamous Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.

In the last chapter of Part II, on "Entertaining Nazi Warriors," Stephen Norwood turns his attention to America's elites, revealing their avid support for Nazism at a critical juncture and their

widespread indifference to Nazi persecution of Jews. Norwood shows how the Hitler regime effectively used voyages of its cruisers, which docked in numerous U.S. ports, in a major effort to promote antisemitism among Americans and, at the same time, to generate goodwill to "the New Germany" to preclude American involvement in the next European conflagration. It was through these propaganda missions that the regime sought to counter charges leveled by Jews and in the Western press exposing its intense antisemitism, and to propagate the view of Nazism as merely a movement for justice and German dignity—and an ideology of peace.

Norwood reveals that in the first year—or even months—of Nazi rule, American and British journalists well informed about German affairs were reporting in the press that the "Nazi brutality against Jews ... was unprecedented in history," that the Jews were "in mortal danger," and that Nazi policies "aimed to exterminate and expel the whole [German] Jewish population." From the beginning of the Nazis' assumption of power, American "Jews at the grassroots" responded with "spontaneous boycotts of German goods." They organized massive demonstrations and protested the libelous harangues of the Nazi propagandists and the accolades accorded the officers and crew of the cruisers that steamed into U.S. harbors flying the swastika flag.

For the most part, however, he finds that American Jews were "largely on their own," joined only "on occasion" in their protests by Communists or left-wing "non-Jewish trade unionists." By contrast, city and state officials, business and society leaders—and the U.S. Navy high command—warmly welcomed the Nazis with elaborate luncheons, teas, galas, and dances—the Navy even including a twenty-one-gun salute. Naval colleges lent their support and joined the celebration as well. The Naval War College hosted lectures by a leading "theorist"/proponent of antisemitism, and the U.S. Naval Academy invited the officers and cadets of a Nazi cruiser to its campus to be feted "as honored guests."

Once again, there are a considerable number of strong parallels—and continuities—between the earlier antisemitic and later

anti-Zionist propaganda campaigns, as well as in the responses they elicited. There is the endlessly invoked defense proffered by many Islamic anti-Zionists that their belief system only means "peace" a claim that generally goes unchallenged. Once more, there are the ceaseless images, designed to elicit Western guilt, of the wrongly injured people only seeking justice and redress—not for the Versailles Treaty or the occupation of the Rhineland, but for the 1947 Partition Plan, the 1949 Armistice Agreements, the occupation that followed the Six-Day War, when fourteen Arab armies fought to destroy Israel and lost—this loss also attributed to stabs in the back. And just as the Nazi regime used German-American societies to spread its propaganda and to publicly acclaim the Führer and the Third Reich, Arab regimes deployed the Organization of Arab Students (OAS) as their "propaganda army." The director of the Arab League Information Center in the United States urged all OAS members to "'infiltrate student organizations' and do all they could to promote the view that 'Israel stands for colonialism' and supporters of Israel are only 'accomplices of colonialism and imperialism.'"1

Notably, unlike the Nazis, the Arab states did not have to send warships to U.S. ports to disseminate their anti-Zionist narrative, because the UN—and universities—provided the platforms through which they reached the elites. After Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Holocaust denier and then-president of Iran, addressed the UN General Assembly in 2010, he had "a 'secret' 'hush-hush meal' ... with 'over one hundred Muslim leaders from across the country," at which Louis Farrakhan, America's leading antisemite at the time, "was the guest seated next to him 'in the first seat in the front.'" Two years later, Farrakhan spoke to 700 students attending the Afrikan Black Coalition Conference at the University of California, Berkeley, where he assured them that "Iran will never attack Israel even though she's being provoked to attack" because "our Islam says we are never to be the aggressor!" After proclaiming that "I will never advise

<sup>1</sup> Eunice G. Pollack, *Racializing Antisemitism: Black Militants, Jews, and Israel,* 1950–Present (Jerusalem: Vidal Sassoon International Centre for the Study of Antisemitism, 2013), 26–27.

young ... Americans to ... spend the lifeblood of Americans for Israeli aggression—I'm asking all Americans to become conscientious objectors!," the students gave him "a standing ovation." And, unlike in the earlier period, when the Far Left on occasion protested antisemitic harangues, in the modern era, the Left is almost always found on the other side, demonizing Israel and championing the anti-Zionist cause.

Part III focuses directly on anti-Zionism, assessing the web of claims at the core of the ideology and analyzing why many selfproclaimed progressives have fervently—even fanatically—embraced this cause. Authors uncover and trace the common, interwoven threads of antisemitic and anti-Zionist charges—ties that most anti-Zionists choose to deny or ignore. Richard Landes finds the progressives "not only ... in denial about themselves—no antisemitism among us!—but in denial about Muslim antisemitism, which thrives in the most lurid forms within the community of the faithful, and to which their progressive allies pay no attention." This part exposes not only the continuity between the earlier prejudice against Jews and the ooze "just beneath" what now appears as "the 'genteel' veneer of anti-Zionism," but reveals that many in the West appear to have adopted the once-discredited policies of appearement. Landes concludes that since 2000, officials have favored "policies of nonconfrontation [which] repeatedly conceded positions of strength to accommodate Muslim 'sensitivities.'" "Perhaps ... most deeply damaging of all," he adds, is "the eagerness with which academics, journalists, and 'human rights' NGOs adopted the triumphalist Muslim's enemy as their own: Israel Unser Unglück"— "Israel Our Misfortune," a slight modification of the ubiquitous Nazi cry.

In Chapter 6, Landes examines how the anti-Zionist narratives—including those of "apocalyptic Jihad"—have been effectively promoted in the West, and why the "progressive camp" finds these "scapegoating, Jew-loathing narratives" so compelling. Landes shows

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 16-17.

<sup>3</sup> Stephen H. Norwood, *Antisemitism and the American Far Left* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

that the Western press, led initially by the BBC and the Guardian, adopted the "persistent, systematic, and pervasive practice" of presenting "Jihadi war propaganda as news." Providing "the public with an inverted image of reality," the press depicts "radical Muslim operatives as 'moderates,'" and labels "those who plan to use democracy to destroy democracy, ... friendly and benign." He characterizes the media's willingness to "swallow whole Palestinian war propaganda aimed at destroying Israel" as "lethal journalism"—as the reporters merely repeat "their accounts of slaughters and massacres, ... unrestrained by any form of journalistic skepticism." Landes attributes this "constant violation of basic standards for information professionals"—which results in an "orgy of accusation against Israel"—in part to "intimidation"—long deployed by Muslims against subject populations and now directed at the infidel reporters in their midst, insuring their deference, their public support of the Arab and Muslim anti-Zionist myths.

Landes investigates and evaluates additional explanations for the "moral and empirical disorientation of the current intelligentsia." He recognizes the important roles played by "the animosity toward Jews among Western intelligentsia," as well as "the power of a politically correct post-colonial ideology that favors 'marginalized and underrepresented minority voices,'" but finds these explanations insufficient. They cannot account for the "near hysteria that characterizes much of the anti-Israel discourse"—where the "negatives" "the post-colonialists" attach to Israel "characterize precisely the enemies of Zionism."

To fully understand the views of the "progressive secular Left," Landes argues, "a position of central importance should be accorded to the role of an unconscious supersessionism." "Post-modern supersessionists," he finds, like their religious forebears, "thrive on narratives about the moral depravity of their rivals." And to the progressives, "the Zionists seem to be the greatest threat ... to their sense that they are the moral cutting edge of the global community." "The profound hostility to Israel as a 'chosen nation' replicates the antagonism towards Jews believing that they are the chosen people."

And where "gentiles [generally] project their own definition of chosenness (the promise of dominion) onto the Jews ... and hate the Jews for what they themselves are," progressives now "share their Jew-hatred"—and their projections—with the greatest "fanatics of dominion on the planet, the Jihadis."

Similarly, in Chapter 7, Jerold Auerbach finds that "the fusion of liberalism and anti-Zionism in the delegitimization of Israel has become the conventional wisdom in academic circles." Acclaimed intellectual celebrities instruct that Zionism is "a colonial and racist movement" that brought "a largely European people" to Palestine, who "pretend that it was empty of inhabitants, conquer it by force, and drive out 70 percent of its inhabitants." This is the currently preferred paradigm, even though, as Auerbach explains, quoting the scholar Ruth Wisse, "Jews have more concurrent rights to their land than any other people on this earth can claim." Indeed, Auerbach points out that it was "Zionist land development," and the "increasing work prospects that accompanied" it "from the end of the nineteenth century, and especially during the decades of British Mandatory rule," that "began to attract Arabs ... who came to Palestine in search of a better life (and eventually became 'Palestinians')."

Moreover, he stresses, quoting the historian Diana Muir, Arabs "neither perceived Palestine as a distinct country, nor Palestinians as a people." Auerbach explains that it was only after Israel won the Six-Day War in June 1967, and "Jordanian rule was terminated" on the West Bank, that "West Bank Arabs began to construct a Palestinian national identity ... in a land that never had been inhabited by a (previously nonexistent) 'Palestinian' people." The reason was clear. As a military commander of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) conceded, "the vision of a Palestinian state ... was merely 'a new tool in the continuing battle against Israel.'" In "constructing their own national narrative," however, Auerbach finds that the "Palestinians" simply "plundered Jewish and Israeli sources." They "reinvented themselves as the 'real' Jews, entitled to the land, history, holy sites, and symbols that have defined Judaism for three millennia."

It was not only the identity of a "Palestinian people" that was purloined and fabricated, but the identity of the leading proponent of the anti-Zionist Palestinian cause on campus. Auerbach observes that Edward Said, professor of English and comparative literature, routinely joined his "jeremiads against Israel" to his "self-identification as a victimized Palestinian refugee," forced, as he put it, by "the 1948 Catastrophe to live in exile." This was, Auerbach conclusively shows, a wholly contrived narrative, and "Israel had nothing ... to do with his profound sense of identity dislocation." It was "only after the Six-Day War" that Said, "by then a tenured professor" at Columbia University, "reinvented himself as a Palestinian"—in an effort to indict the Jewish state. The parallel was clear—like earlier refugees, he had been driven into exile on Morningside Heights by the new "Nazi state." Apparently, in an era that often demands authenticity, exceptions are made when the fable advances the anti-Zionist cause—and Said achieved—and retained—iconic status. The charlatan also serves, however, as a symbol of a campus that has lost its way.

Chapter 8, which I wrote, examines the core myths promoted by anti-Zionists over the years, an amalgam of the harshest vilifications and tropes of the era. Echoing hoary anti-Judaic charges, it is the Zionists who are now deemed insatiably "bloodthirsty"—though "genocide" replaces deicide, and it is "the Zionist creed" that mandates "mastery of the 'Chosen People' over the 'Arab natives.'" The next layer is composed of easily recognizable inversions—the "race-supremacist Zionists" deploying napalm—not Zyklon B—as they embark on "the 'final solution' to the 'Arab problem' in Palestine."

Surrounding these condemnations is always the anti-Zionist myth that there was no need for a Jewish state because Jews had been happily ensconced as equal "citizens" in Muslim lands for more than a millennium. Moreover, the Jews—unlike the Arabs and, in later versions, the Palestinians—form only a religious group, never a people or a nation, and the Arab states had always ensured "justice and equality ... regardless of ... creed," with "anti-Jewish

attitudes ... virtually unknown in the Arab world." It was Islam—the Arabs assured the credulous West—that had been the source of this "perfect harmony"—because Islam is "a most tolerant faith." Thus, unlike the Palestinians, who were driven out of their land, there were no Jewish refugees from Arab lands. Lured only by Zionist "blackmail," *they* departed in "conditions of leisure and ease."

I show that these anti-Zionist claims were factitious—"bore no resemblance to reality." Travelers to Arab lands reported that Muslims treated Jews "with more disdain than they would their animals," or "as a master might treat a slave." And it was Islam, which taught that Jews were "laden with Allah's anger," and thus would suffer "degradation in *this* world and a mighty chastisement in the next world," that sealed their fate. For over a millennium, the Pact of Umar, in which were encoded the teachings of the Qur'an, provided the web of restrictions that ensured the Jews' "subjugation, humiliation and inferiority" to Muslims—though they would be "tolerated as a faith."

After centuries of subjugating and abasing Jews, driven by the conviction that this was mandated by Allah, Arabs and Muslims could not—or would not—accommodate the strong, autonomous Jewish state. I argue that Arab/Muslim attacks on Israelis—which the West routinely construes only as rational responses to egregious acts—were strongly influenced by the centuries-old patterns of their persecution of inferior Jews. Arab youth "stoning" Zionists are holding fast to their traditional mode of expressing enmity and contempt for Jews. The false charges regularly leveled at Israelis—accepted uncritically by "progressives" in the West—are often echoes of an abusive practice deeply rooted in a time when "courts would not accept a Jew's testimony over that of a Muslim." Similarly, I show that many of the allegations of execrable Israeli actions should be seen largely as "projections of Muslims' time-honored treatment of the subjugated Jews."

I also elaborate on the explicitly theological dimensions of the anti-Zionist assault on the Jewish state, as Muslims increasingly defined their conflict with Zionists and the "Zionist entity" in religious terms. Sermons framed the clash as a death-struggle with the "arch-enemy of Islam"—a continuation of the Prophet's wars with the Jews. Clerics reminded the faithful that "the Jews of our time are the descendants of the Jews who harmed the Prophet" and summoned them to "purify Holy Palestine from their filth."

Muslim clerics dismissed "the Zionist claim that Palestine ... is the spiritual and national homeland of the Jewish people" as "utter nonsense." I show how they were aided in their efforts by mainstream Protestant theologians, who offered "proof" that Zionists intentionally "misinterpret Holy Scripture to justify Jews' return to Palestine." These theologians rejected Christian Zionists' views as arising "out of ignorance," and stressed that there is "within the Old Testament ... no prophecy of a 'second return.'" A sinful people, who disobeyed "the will of God," the Jews' punishment after the destruction of the Second Temple was to remain forever "scattered among the nations." The New Covenant had replaced the Old—"universalism" had supplanted the "'nationalism' of the Jewish tradition"—the concept of "Israel of the flesh" had given way to that of "Israel of the spirit." The promise of the restoration of the Jews' homeland had been superseded. Muslims could now point to "proof" that the Bible did not support a Jewish state. They could plausibly proclaim that they were not opposed to Judaism—and thus could not be considered antisemitic.

This part closes with Edward Alexander's analysis, in Chapter 9, of leftist Jewish intellectuals' problematic responses—non-responses—to the Holocaust and the Jewish state. It was, Alexander shows, the publication of Hannah Arendt's *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (1963) that aroused "a storm of controversy," especially among the Jewish intelligentsia, over her allegations that "the Jews had cooperated significantly in their own destruction" in the Holocaust. In a larger sense, he explains, the conflict was over "the ingrained intellectual tradition of blaming Jews for the violence unleashed against them"—a tendency that persists in the relentless faulting of Israel for the attacks on it.

Arendt's egregious claims and the clashes that ensued also led some to consider—at last—in the pained reflection of "the socialist

and literary critic Irving Howe," "why our intellectual community ... had paid so little attention to the Holocaust at the time it was taking place." Moreover, as Alexander observes, "the 'first-rank' Jewish intellectuals" continued to show the same "appalling indifference" when, "a few years after the destruction of European Jewry, the Jewish people had created the State of Israel ... imposing a pattern of meaning upon otherwise incomprehensible suffering."

Alexander then addresses the "new challenge" that confronted Jewish intellectuals when, after Israel defeated the Arabs in the Six-Day War—which the president of Egypt had promised would "turn the Mediterranean red with Jewish blood"—the Arabs "commenced [or amplified] an ideological onslaught against Zionism itself." By 1970, Howe recognized the response—"the treachery of the younger generation of Jewish intellectuals"—"children of the generation that saw Auschwitz, hate democratic Israel and celebrate as 'revolutionary' the Egyptian dictatorship; ... a few ... collect money for Al Fatah, which pledges to take Tel Aviv. About this, I cannot say more; it is simply too painful."

Considering the decades since 1970, Alexander confirms Howe's worst fears—"the tenacity of the Arabs' rejection of Israel and their worldwide campaign to destroy Israel's moral image ... have brought about a mass defection of Jewish liberals from Israel." Dividing them into several categories, Alexander identifies, for example, "ashamed Jews"—"desperate to escape the negative role in which they are being cast by the alleged sins of Israel." Some, as Tony Judt, "recommend politicide—the end of Israel"—as the cure for their own "insecurity." Others, who have no connection to their Jewishness, invent "their Jewish 'identity'" by becoming anti-Zionists. Flaunting "their own goodness" "by denouncing Israel for its manifold sins, [they] call for the dismantling of the [Jewish] state."

Then there is the "organization called J Street," which heads the list of "Zionists against Israel." Although J Street "misses no opportunity to blacken Israel's reputation, and ... very few opportunities to encourage campaigns to delegitimize it, ... it insists on calling itself 'pro-Israel, pro-peace.'" The sociologist Werner Cohn, Alexander

points out, has characterized J Street as a "spectacle of methodical disingenuousness."

Part IV focuses on theological components of support for, and opposition to, the Jewish state. In Chapter 10, Benjamin Ginsberg explores both the doctrinal and "earthly considerations" that led evangelicals—known as Christian Zionists—to become unwavering supporters of Israel. This was so central to their belief-system that, Ginsberg notes, the evangelical minister Jerry Falwell "was fond of declaring that God commanded Americans to support Israel." Understandably, "Every Israeli prime minister since David BenGurion himself has cultivated the friendship of America's evangelical leaders."

Ginsberg explains that Christian Zionists maintain that their "support for Israel is based directly upon Holy Scripture, ... [which] makes it clear that God gave the Holy Land to the Jews ... but definitely not to Ishmael," from whom Muslims claim descent. Moreover, as premillennialists, "most white evangelical Protestants ... believe that Israel has a critical role to play in end times." In a larger sense, they also recognize the importance of "God's promise to Abraham to bless those who bless the Jews and curse those who curse the Jews." Some evangelicals—the dispensationalists—contend that "the return of the Jews to the Holy Land and the reestablishment of the biblical Jewish kingdom" signal that "the Millennium—[the] one-thousand-year reign of Christ on earth"—is near.

Ginsberg observes that the disputes over Israel within the Christian community often "seem to have a theological basis," as "Israel's mainline Protestant critics are ... covenantalists," who believe that "God's ... promises to the Jews were already fulfilled by the coming of Jesus, his death and resurrection, and the founding of the Christian church." With the establishment of the Jewish state, however, evangelicals would contend that they had won the argument—"their truth [had been proven] true." Notably, "in the 1940s, a majority of American Protestants belonged to the mainline liberal denominations. Today, the evangelicals outnumber [them] by a 2 to 1 margin."

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